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ABSTRACT

In the first essay, I examine the burden of cross-listing prices to adjust to changes in
exchange rates. Using a 3-system vector moving average model, I measure the effects of
exchange rate shocks on cross-listing stock prices in the home and U.S. markets. My
sample consists of 46 cross-listings on the NYSE from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico.
Findings indicate that New York prices bear roughly 60% of the adjustment to exchange
rates for Canadian and Mexican securities, and roughly 45% for Brazilian securities. The
NYSE burden of adjustment varies considerably across firms, ranging from 7% to 100%
for Canada, 10% to 79% for Brazil, and 24% to 90% for Mexico. Tests show that the
NYSE burden to adjust to exchange rate changes is highest for big firms, and for those
with relatively high NYSE trading costs or low NYSE trading volume. For the majority
of firms, tests also show that the combined markets burdens to adjust to exchange rates
increase during the period of heightened exchange rate volatility. My results have
important implications for international price discovery tests, especially for those that fail
to model an independent role for exchange rates at the firm level.
In the second essay, I examine the dynamics of price discovery for markets with
varying market characteristics. I estimate Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share over two
distinct time periods of 2008 for my sample of 23 Canadian firms, 13 Brazilian firms, and
10 Mexican firms. In contrast to most prior research, I find that the home market does not
always dominate the NYSE based on key trading characteristics, nor is it always the price
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discovery leader. Findings show that the price discovery on the NYSE is higher for crosslistings with greater NYSE market depth, lower burden to adjust to exchange rates on the
NYSE, with greater trading volume and lower cost, and for smaller, low market-to-book
firms. Findings show that market depth and the burden of prices to adjust to exchange
rate shocks are key determinants for price discovery that rival the importance of trading
volume and cost.
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CHAPTER 1
LOST IN TRANSLATION:
WHICH STOCKS BEAR THE BURDEN TO ADJUST TO EXCHANGE RATES?

The efficient markets hypothesis assumes that security market prices rapidly reflect new
information, making it very difficult to “beat the market.” However, the efficient markets
hypothesis is agnostic regarding precisely where new information is first reflected for
securities that trade in more than one marketplace, i.e. where price discovery occurs.
Recent research attempts to locate where price discovery occurs for stocks that cross-list
internationally, but often ignores the informational role of exchange rates in the price
formation process.1 In related work, Grammig et al. (2005) offer simulations showing
that the failure to properly model exchange rates leads to biased price discovery
estimates, especially during periods of high exchange rate volatility.
The goal of my study is to measure the effect of exchange rate shocks on stock
prices for cross-listings from distinct markets over volatile currency time periods. My
study is designed to provide robust tests of the independent informational role of
exchange rates in the price discovery process. Specifically, I assess the impact of
exchange rate shocks on U.S. and home market prices for 46 cross-listings on the NYSE
from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico during 2008, one of the most volatile periods for stocks
1

Most firms cross-list in the U.S. via ADRs, which originate from many countries. In contrast, direct crosslistings (not via ADRs) are mostly limited to Canadian and Israeli stocks. To list as an ordinary share, firms
must register with the SEC, comply with SEC regulations, and provide financial statements that comply
with US GAAP. Further discussion of direct cross-listing requirements can be found in Karolyi (1998). See
Karolyi (2006) for a survey and critical review of the literature related to international cross-listings.
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and currencies in recent history. The three home markets are characterized with different
degrees of financial development, investor protection, insider trading law enforcement,
liquidity, cost, and trading volume. Also, the markets provide the largest number of
cross-listings, and the three markets span the continuum from developed market (Canada)
to emerging market (Mexico). While the three markets share significant intraday trading
overlap, the geographic proximities of each market to New York differ substantially. All
three markets are major economic trade partners with the U.S. For instance, as of 2010,
U.S. is the top economic trade partner with Canada and Mexico and is the second biggest
trade partner with Brazil, all of which suggests that the markets might share in the burden
to adjust to exchange rates more equally versus the three German stocks studied by
Grammig et al. (2005).
Most cross-listing price discovery papers examine relations between home prices
and foreign prices, after converting prices to a common currency. Each cross-listing into
the U.S. signifies ownership in the underlying security originating from the foreign
market. In the absence of arbitrage restrictions, the law of one price suggests that the two
securities be priced identically, at all points in time, after adjusting for exchange rates.
However, exchange rate shocks might exert an independent effect on stock prices, and
the effect may be asymmetric for the home and foreign markets. For example,
depreciation of the Mexican peso versus the U.S. dollar (alternatively, appreciation of the
dollar versus the peso) likely will lead to an increase in the peso price of the security on
the BOLSA and a decrease in the dollar price on the NYSE. But, no evidence exists to
suggest that the two prices will automatically meet in the middle. Nor is there evidence
suggesting that all of the burden is borne by just one market, which is the assumption
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implicitly made by most cross-listing studies when converting prices to a common
currency.
Grammig et al. (2005) show that the choice of currency conversion matters. Their
simulation shows that price discovery inferences depend on whether the home currency is
converted to the foreign currency or if the foreign currency is converted to the home
currency, and that the errors in inference increase with the volatility of exchange rates.
The authors also examine three German stocks that cross-listed between the Frankfurt
and New York Stock Exchange during the three month period August 1999 – October
1999. Relying on tests that endogenize the exchange rate, their findings show that most of
the exchange rate burden was borne by the NYSE. The authors conclude that the foreign
investor “is subject to exchange rate risk in that prices incorporate another source of
uncertainty beyond the value of the firm itself, and this is not the case for the homemarket investor.”
The Grammig et al. (2005) paper makes important contributions, but is limited
with respect to the number of stocks, concentration of stocks in a dominant home market,
short overlapping intraday trading interval, and examination of relatively stable dollar to
euro exchange rates. Whether exchange rate uncertainty truly imposes a burden on
foreign investors and whether this relationship holds outside the Germany-U.S. country
3-stock pairing is unknown. In contrast, my tests are conducted on a sample characterized
by a greater mix of “international” and domestic firms versus the three blue chip German
stock sample studied by Grammig et al. (2005), and span a period of significant stock
price and currency volatility.
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To estimate the burden borne by each stock to adjust to exchange rate shocks, I
develop a 3-system vector moving average model that produces impulse response
coefficients related to exchange rate shocks. I create a translation risk measure equal to
the percentage of the exchange rate – stock price adjustment borne by the NYSE relative
to the combined adjustments of the NYSE and home markets. A high (low) percentage
indicates that the NYSE (home) bears most of the burden to adjust to exchange rate
shocks.
My tests show that New York prices bear roughly 60% of the adjustment to
exchange rates for Canadian and Mexican securities, and roughly 45% for Brazilian
securities. Results differ markedly across firms and across time, and show that the
combined markets’ burdens to adjust to exchange rates increase during the period of high
exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks
is not homogeneous within country, and is sensitive to exchange rate volatility. I find that
the burden on New York prices to adjust to exchange rates is higher for larger firms and
for firms with lower trading volume and higher bid-ask spreads on the NYSE versus the
home market. These findings indicate that the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rates
is expected to shift more to emerging markets as the migration of cross-listing trading
volume to the NYSE increases.
My study has important implications for price discovery tests that ignore the
informational role that exchange rates have on stock prices. Tests that fail to model the
independent effect of exchange rates produce misleading price discovery results. In
particular, these tests measure the combined effect on prices of fundamental news about
the company and news about exchange rates.
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In my tests, I am able to disentangle the effects on stock prices of firm-specific
fundamental news and exchange rate news. Also, I am able to show the extent to which
each stock’s price discovery is affected by the exchange rate burden. My findings show
that the exchange rate burden is not a broad market-based effect, but instead is a stockspecific effect. Therefore, any attempts to model the effect of exchange rates with
market-wide adjustments are wrong.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The methodology is explained in Section 1.
The data are detailed in Section 2. Testable propositions are presented in Section 3.
Results are discussed in Section 4, and concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
1.1.

Methodology

For any cross-listing, log prices are assumed to evolve by the following processes:

PHOME ,t  Pt   HOME ,t

(1.1)

PNYSE ,t  Pt   NYSE ,t

(1.2)

Pt  Pt 1   P,t

(1.3)

EH /US ,t  EH /US ,t 1   E ,t

(1.4)

Pt is the equilibrium (log) price stated in the home currency, and EH/US is the logtransformed home price of one US dollar. By assumption, the innovations

 HOME ,t ,  NYSE ,t ,  P,t , and  E ,t are serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated with zero
mean.
Ignoring microstructure issues such as trading frictions and costs for the moment,
the home price must equal the currency converted NYSE price, using the law of one price
argument. Stated more formally, the product of the NYSE dollar price and the exchange
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rate equals the NYSE price converted to the home currency. The natural log of the
product of the prices equals the sum of the natural logs: PNYSE ,t  EH /US ,t . Thus, in order
for the law of one price to hold in the 3-system model, PHOME ,t  PNYSE ,t  EH /US ,t . 2 With
this set-up, the 3-system error correction model can be expressed as:
N

PHOME ,t  cHOME   HOME ( PHOME ,t 1  PNYSE ,t 1  EH /US ,t 1 )    HOME ,HOME ,i PHOME ,t i 
i 1

N


i 1

N

HOME , NYSE ,i

PNYSE ,t i    HOME , E ,i EH /US ,t i   HOME ,t

(1.5)

i 1

N

PNYSE ,t  cNYSE   NYSE ( PHOME ,t 1  PNYSE ,t 1  EH /US ,t 1 )    NYSE , HOME ,i PHOME ,t i 
i 1

N


i 1

N

NYSE , NYSE ,i

PNYSE ,t i    NYSE , E ,i EH /US ,t i   NYSE ,t

(1.6)

i 1

N

EH /US ,t  cE   E ( PHOME ,t 1  PNYSE ,t 1  EH /US ,t 1 )    E , HOME ,i PHOME ,t i 
i 1

N


i 1

N

E , NYSE ,i

PNYSE ,t i    E , E ,i EH /US ,t i   E ,t

(1.7)

i 1

The equations indicate that prices respond to the prior period’s deviation from the longrun equilibrium (the error correction term), and to lagged changes in prices and exchange
rates.
Equations 1.5 – 1.7 can be restated in matrix form, as
N

pt  c   ' pt 1    i pt i   t ,

(1.8)

i 1

2

Stated differently, the log home price minus the sum of the log NYSE price and the log exchange rate
equals  HOME ,t  ( NYSE ,t  EH /US ,t ), where  HOME ,t   NYSE ,t  EH /US ,t is the exchange rate adjusted log pricing
error on the NYSE. Therefore, the linear combination of the log price on the home market, the log price on
the NYSE, and the log exchange rate equals the difference in the currency-adjusted pricing errors
 HOME ,t  ( NYSE ,t  EH /US ,t ). This result implies that the linear combination of the log prices and exchange
rate is stationary, and that the log home price, log NYSE price, and log exchange rate are cointegrated with
cointegrating vector    (1, 1, 1); e.g, (1, -1, -1)×(PHOME, PNYSE, EH/US)′ = PHOME – (PNYSE + EH/US) =
 HOME ,t  ( NYSE ,t  EH /US ,t ).
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where, ∆pt is the 3 × 1 vector of changes in prices (∆PHOME,t , ∆PHOME,t, ∆EH/US,t )′, c is 3 ×
1 vector of constants, α is the 3 × 1 vector of adjustment parameters, β′ is the 1 × 3
cointegrating vector, pt-1 is a 3 × 1 vector of prices for period t-1,  i are 3 × 3 matrices of
autoregressive coefficients for lag i = 1, 2, …, N, and εt is the 3 × 1 vector of error terms.
If the law of one price holds in the long run, then prices are cointegrated, and β′ = (1 -1, 1).
Employing the Wold Representation Theorem on Equation (1.8) yields:
pt   t  1 t 1  2 t 2 

 ( L) t

(1.9)

where each  i is a 3 × 3 vector moving average (VMA) matrix. Next, the Beveridge and
Nelson (1981) decomposition is applied to ( L) t , and summing over time to yield:
t

pt  p0   (1)  s  * ( L) t

(1.10)

s 1

where  (1)  I  1  2 

, and measures the long-run impact of a shock to the level

of prices, and Ψ* is a matrix polynomial. Estimating the  (1) matrix is the cornerstone of
the analysis since the elements contain information about the permanent effect that each
of the innovations exert on the long-run dynamics of the prices. The values of the  (1)
elements can be backed out of the parameterized VEC model Equation (1.8) by
computing the impulse response functions.
To derive the permanent impacts associated with price innovations, I apply Stock
and Watson’s (1988) common trends representation for cointegrated systems, in which:
 HOME , HOME  HOME , NYSE  HOME , E    HOME ,t 



 (1) t    NYSE , HOME  NYSE , NYSE  NYSE , E    NYSE ,t 
 
 E , NYSE
 E , E    E ,t 
 E , HOME
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(1.11)

Each  ij represents the permanent impact on price i of an innovation in price j. For
example,  HOME , NYSE is the long-run impact on the home market price of a shock to the
NYSE price,  HOME , E is the long-run impact of a shock to the home market price of a
shock to the exchange rate, etc. Given that the elements in the vector pt are ordered as

PHOME ,t , PNYSE ,t , and EH /US , the first row of (1) t ,

 HOME , HOME HOME ,t  HOME , NYSE NYSE,t  HOME, E E ,t , gives the long-run component of the
innovations that are permanently impounded in the home market price.
The coefficients  HOME , E and  NYSE , E measure the long-run impacts of a shock to
the exchange rate on prices on the home market and the NYSE, respectively. These
coefficients are particularly important because they capture any asymmetric responses of
stock prices to changes in exchange rates, and are used to measure the NYSE burden to
adjust to exchange rates (or TRP).
For each stock, I create a translation risk percentage (TRP) equal to:
TRP 

ABS (ˆ NYSE , E )
ˆ HOME , E  ABS (ˆ NYSE , E )

(1.12)

Either PHOME ,t must respond (as measured by  HOME , E ) to the exchange rate shock, or

PNYSE ,t must respond (as measured by  NYSE , E ) to the exchange rate shock, or both series
must respond. The sum of both parameters (in absolute value) can be interpreted as the
combined total response to an exchange rate shock. If responses to an exchange rate
shock are symmetric then TRP will equal 0.5. On the other hand, a high TRP indicates
that the NYSE bears most of the exchange rate burden.
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To date, no study focuses explicitly on the identification of markets that bear the
brunt of the exchange rate burden across a diverse set of firms. There is no reason to
expect that markets will respond symmetrically to exchange rate shocks such that TRP
equals 50%. Robust tests of exchange rate effects are offered in the current study that
examines a diverse sample in terms of individual companies, industry affiliations, and
countries, as well as a more volatile currency time period and intraday trading overlaps. 3
1.2.

Data

I use tick-by-tick quote and price data from the Securities Industry Research Centre of
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) database, which is the standard source for international intraday
data. SIRCA receives the original data from Thomson-Reuters, and provides global
intraday trade, quote, and market depth for stocks and other instruments.4 Data used in
the cross-sectional tests are derived from Datastream, Bloomberg, and SEC filings. My
sample includes 10 Mexican, 13 Brazilian, and 23 Canadian cross-listings for 2008. I
adjust U.S. prices for changes in the exchange rate using intraday bid and ask exchange
rate quotes obtained from Olsen and Associates. The following steps summarize my data
collection and management procedures.
Starting with the raw tick-by-tick quote data, I create 1-minute interval data
points. I drop observations with a spread equal to or less than 0, then capture the closing
bid/ask quote for each minute and assign it to that minute-interval. Obvious data errors
3

Although not focused on the identification of markets that bear the brunt of the exchange rate burden,
Grammig et al. (2005) conduct tests on three German stocks that cross-list onto the NYSE and find that
New York prices respond more than Frankfurt prices to exchange rates. Their result is not surprising in
light of their limited sample from a dominant home market. The main purpose of their study is offer
simulations of the effects of endogenizing exchange rates, not on empirical tests of exchange rate burdens.
For example, their empirical data are characterized by brief intraday trading overlaps (25% of the trading
day), limited sample size, and stable exchange rates.
4

Thomson Reuters Tick History provides millisecond time-stamped data for over 35 million OTC
exchange-traded instruments worldwide.
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(negative spreads, zero spreads, or outrageous spreads) are eliminated.5 In my final
screen for errors, I filter the data using the Billor et al. (2000) blocked adaptive
computationally efficient outlier nominators (BACON) method. The BACON approach is
computationally efficient, and is particularly appropriate for large datasets. The BACON
method begins by identifying a subset of the sample (called the “basic sample”) that is
“safely” free of outliers. Then, the method iteratively expands on the basic sample by
creating a new basic sample containing observations with acceptable Mahalonobis
distances relative to the previous basic sample median (or mean). The acceptable distance
is chosen using a percentile of the chi-square distribution. Billor et al. used the 95th
percentile in their simulation. The iterations continue until the size of the basic sample
stabilizes. I replace all outliers with quote data from the previous minute. As explained by
Hasbrouck (2007), unlike transactions data, quote-midpoints can be propagated forward
because bid-ask quotes are considered open until a change is reported.
To avoid the disproportionate loss of observations clustered around significant
volatility events, I applied the procedures in a univariate manner to each stock separately
for each day. I also visually inspected every stock in the sample for data errors by
graphing prices and exchange rates at 1-minute intervals. The procedures did very well
identifying outliers without loss of information. Note that it is common to filter
microstructure data, as pointed out in many microstructure papers (see, for example,
Kryzanoski and Zhang (2002) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)).6

5

I define an outrageous spread as greater than 70% of the quote midpoint. Garfinkel (2009), Chung and
Zhang (2009) delete observations where the bid-ask spread is greater than 50% of the quote-midpoint.
Thus, my method is more relaxed than others. Some valid observations, especially in Brazil or Mexico,
would be eliminated if I used the same cut-off that they use for their NYSE samples.
6

Kryzanoski and Zhang (2002) apply outlier treatment, filtering 0.6% of their transactions data.
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I exclude stocks that split during 2008. As explained in Eun and Sabherwal
(2003), stock splits in the home and NYSE exchanges can differ by several days
(typically a week), which would cause data synchronicity problems in my tests.
1.3.

Testable Propositions

I examine three propositions. First, I examine the proposition that most of the exchange
rate burden for cross-listings is borne on the foreign market, i.e., on the NYSE. A TRP
estimate that significantly exceeds 50% will support the proposition. Second, I examine
the proposition that the combined markets’ burdens to adjust to exchange rates rises
during crisis periods. This proposition is supported if the sum of the absolute value psi
estimates  HOME , E and  NYSE , E increases significantly in the crisis period versus the precrisis period. Third, I examine the proposition that the burden to adjust to exchange rates
is related to trading volume, and firm size advantages (e.g., that the NYSE burden to
adjust to exchange rates is negatively related to the NYSE trading volume as a percentage
of total trading volume, negatively related to the HOME trading cost relative to the
NYSE trading cost, and negatively related to firm size – a familiarity argument).
1.4.

Results

1.4.A. Exchange Rates Before and After September 15, 2008
I delineate the tests before and after the September 15, 2008 announcement of the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy declaration. Uncertainties in global markets began rising
around September 7 when Government Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac were placed in government conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. But, the September 15 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy announcement jolted
markets and triggered subsequent shockwaves. In particular, at the same time as the
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Lehman announcement, reeling Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, and the Fed
injected enormous amounts of cash into the banking system including $85 billion to AIG
alone. The S&P500 fell nearly 5% on September 15 and the VIX soared an
unprecedented 24%, making it the worst stock market day in seven years. On September
25, facilitated by the FDIC, J. P. Morgan acquired failed Washington Mutual Savings and
Loan, which was the largest bank failure in U.S. history. On October 3, Wells Fargo
announced plans to acquire failing Wachovia Corporation, and on the same day,
Congress passed the largest financial bailout in history totaling $700 billion in bailout
money. The S&P500 dropped nearly 10% over the 2-day period October 6 and 7 after the
Fed announced it would make up to $900 billion available to U.S. banks through its Term
Auction lending facility.
The unprecedented events in the latter part of 2008 also had significant effects on
exchange rates, as demand for U.S. dollars soared. For example, from September 15
through the end of 2008, the U.S. dollar rose over 15% relative to the Canadian dollar,
32% relative to the Brazilian real, and 30% relative to the Mexican peso. Figure 1.1
illustrates the spike in exchange rate volatility after mid-September 2008 at the time of
the Lehman Brothers announcement.
To better understand the burden of different stocks and markets to respond to
exchange rates, I conduct all my tests on individual stocks separately for all trading days
from January 1, 2008 through September 14, 2008 (“low exchange rate volatility”
period), and for all trading days from September 15, 2008 through December 31, 2008
(“high exchange rate volatility” period). The latter period tests offer a unique
examination of exchange rate burdens during a uniquely volatile exchange rate period. Of
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particular note is the simulation of Grammig et al. (2008) showing that price discovery
inferences are dramatically affected by volatile exchange rates. The study of the latter
part of 2008 offers an important empirical test of the simulation conclusions.
1.4.B. Market Characteristics
Tables 1.1 – 1.3 present market characteristics for each of the sampled stocks in Canada,
Brazil, and Mexico, respectively. The tables report the company name, industry
affiliation, NYSE listing date, NYSE volume as a percentage of total volume trading on
the two exchanges, relative cost ratio, and USD total assets. NYSE % Volume of Total
equals the U.S. dollar value of trading volume on the NYSE divided by the combined
U.S. dollar value of trading volume on the NYSE and the home exchange. A percentage
above 50% indicates that greater volume traded on the NYSE relative to the home
exchange. Cost Ratio is calculated as follows: for each exchange, for each minute, I
calculate the percent bid-ask spread equal to the ask price minus the bid price, divided by
the midpoint of the two prices. The Cost Ratio equals the percent bid-ask spread for the
home exchange divided by the percent bid-ask spread for the NYSE exchange. A Cost
Ratio above one indicates spreads are relatively larger on the home exchange versus the
NYSE. Sample-wide averages and medians are presented at the bottom of each table.
Results for the Canadian sample indicate that, on average, trading volume was
higher on the TSE (NYSE % Volume of Total was less than 50% for most of the stocks),
and bid-ask spreads were smaller (Cost Ratio was less than 1 for most of the stocks).
These findings indicate that the TSE maintained a cost and trading volume advantage
versus the NYSE.
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For the Brazilian sample (Table 1.2), trading volume and percent bid-ask spreads
were lower on the NYSE for most stocks. Cosan Limited stands out as an outlier, in
which most of the trading occurred on the NYSE. Therefore, the abnormal cost ratio for
Cosan Limited is not meaningful. For the Mexican sample (Table 1.3), trading volume is
higher, and the percent bid-ask spreads are lower on the NYSE for most stocks.
In summary, the three markets exhibit wide differences in characteristics. For
Canadian cross-listings, the TSE dominates the NYSE on both trading volume and cost.
For Brazilian ADRs, trading volume favors the BOVESPA, but cost favors the NYSE.
And, for Mexican ADRs, both trading volume and cost favor the NYSE. The lack of
dominance of the home market for Mexico and Brazil adds to the robustness of our tests,
and offers a major contrast with existing studies of cross-listing price discovery (Ding et
al. (1999), Solnik (1996), Lieberman et al. (1999), Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), Wang
(2002), and Eun and Sabherwal (2003a, 2003b), and Harris et al. (2007)). Not
surprisingly, cross-listing studies of dominant home markets find that home markets also
dominate the price discovery process. However, the robustness of price discovery tests is
weakened when restricted to dominant home markets.
1.4.C. Cointegration Tests
Before estimating the vector error correction model, I determine the number of lags in the
model using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz (1978)). Then, I use
Johansen’s (1988) method to test for cointegration, and confirm that there is only one
cointegrating vector. 7 The results of the Johansen’s (1988) rank test method support the
hypothesis of one cointegrating vector among the three price series (prices at home,
7

Critical values (for models where the cointegrating vector
provided in Johansen and Julius (1990).
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 is (n  1)

and n is greater than 2) are

prices on the NYSE, and the exchange rate). The cointegrating vectors are estimated
using Johansen’s (1995) maximum likelihood method and are reported in Tables 1.4 to
1.6. The results offer strong support for the theoretical values discussed in section II.C.
The median cointegrating vectors, rounded to two decimal places, are (1.00,-1.00,-1.00)
over both periods for all countries. This finding indicates that prices converge after
adjusting for exchange rates. The prices do not deviate without bound, and subsequently
tend to correct toward each other.
1.4.D. Impulse Response Functions
The vector moving average ψ matrices form the basis of analysis to show the time
evolution of the effect on stock prices of a one-time shock to exchange rates. One might
suspect that because the NYSE is a derivative or satellite market relative to the home
market, that the NYSE will bear most of the adjustment to exchange rate changes.
However, the NYSE is the most liquid, transparent, and recognized exchange in the
world and the U.S. is a leading financial center and importer of foreign goods. In this
case, NYSE prices might offer information to which the home market responds.
Therefore, it is unclear the extent to which the NYSE will bear the burden to adjust to
exchange rate shocks. Only the empirical analysis can reveal the true relations.
I simulate the vector error correction models to derive impulse response functions
(IRF) for each stock. The IRFs illustrate the impact on stock prices of a 1-time, 1-unit
increase to EH /US ; i.e., a depreciation in the home currency relative to the U.S. dollar, or,
alternatively, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to the home currency. The Ψ(1)
matrix consists of the permanent effects (i.e., the values to which the impulse response
function converges) of the exchange rate shock. Since it is not feasible to present the
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IRFs for each of the sampled stocks, I plot the IRF for three stocks for each market: the
stocks with the smallest, median, and largest translation risk percentage (TRP).
Figure 1.2 illustrates the IRFs. Each IRF extends 500 steps ahead. Each step
represents 1 minute in time. A positive shock to EH /US is expected to cause stock prices to
rise in the home exchange and/or to fall on the NYSE. The left side panel presents IRFs
for stocks with the smallest TRP within Brazil, Mexico, and Canada, respectively. The
middle panel presents IRFs for stocks with the median TRP within each market. The
right side panel presents IRFs for stocks with the largest TRP within each market. TRP
equals the burden of the NYSE price to adjust to changes in exchange rates, relative to
the combined adjustment of the NYSE and home exchanges. The exact response for each
stock is determined by the TRP for the stock. A high TRP indicates that the NYSE prices
bear most of the burden to adjust to the exchange rate shock (the right side IRFs for each
market in Figure 1.2). A low TRP indicates that the NYSE prices bear little of the burden
to adjust to the exchange rate shock (the left side IRFs for each market in Figure 1.2).
Very interesting patterns emerge in the IRFs. In contrast to claims made on
limited samples by Grammig et al. (2005) and Frijns et al. (2010), my findings show that
stocks do not respond similarly to exchange rate shocks. In particular, the left and right
side panels reveal stark contrasts, illustrating dramatic differences in responses of prices
to the exchange rate shock. The middle panel offers the median tendency for each
country, and illustrate how New York prices tend to respond more than home prices to
the exchange rate shocks for Canadian and Mexican securities, and how home prices are
affected more for Brazilian securities. The IRFs show that the impacts of the exchange
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rate shock are persistent – the impacts level off after about 20 to 50 minutes (which is
similar to the findings of Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Grammig et al. (2005)).8
1.4.E. Permanent Impulse Response Coefficients
The elements of the Ψ(1) matrix consist of the permanent impulse response coefficients
or price impact coefficients.  HOME , E is the home price impact associated with exchange
rate changes, and  NYSE , E is the NYSE price impact associated with exchange rate
changes. If I find that ˆ NYSE , E  ˆ HOME , E (e.g., TRP > 50%), then I can conclude that the
NYSE bears over half of the exchange rate burden. In their study of three blue chip
German stocks, Grammig et al. (2005) find that “New York prices bear almost all of the
adjustment to exchange rate changes” (p 162). But, little is known about pricing
dynamics for cross-listings domiciled in less dominant home stock markets such as
Mexico and Brazil. There is little reason to believe that the brief overlapping trading
results for three blue chip German stocks can be generalized for all stocks for all markets.
Paired coordinates for  HOME , E and  NYSE , E are graphed in Figure 1.3. For each
firm,  HOME , E is graphed on the Y-axis and  NYSE , E is graphed on the X-axis. Points that
fall near the 45 degree line indicate a more symmetric response to exchange rate shocks
(i.e., equal burden for the NYSE versus home prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks).

8

Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine an equally-weighted portfolio of Canadian cross-listings, and find
that the response of the NYSE portfolio to exchange rate shocks far exceeds the response of the TSE
portfolio. More recently, Frijns et al. (2010) examine exchange rate effects for nine stocks cross-listing
between Australia and New Zealand. Similar to Grammig et al.(2005), the authors find that the foreign
market bears most of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks. A major limitation to these studies lies
in the examination of dominant home markets only, the examination of fairly stable exchange rate periods,
and, in the case of the latter two studies, small numbers of stocks.
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Points that fall below the 45 degree line correspond to firms in which NYSE prices bore
the larger burden to adjust to exchange rates.
Five findings emerge from the psi estimates in Tables 1.4 – 1.6 and Figure 1.3.
For the time being I focus on the sample-wide results. Discussion of country-specific
findings will be offered when I discuss the results reframed as TRPs. First, Tables 1.4 –
1.6 show that all estimates have the expected signs: ˆ HOME , E values are positive and

ˆ NYSE , E are negative for every stock.9 Second, Figure 1.3 shows that the ψ estimates are
widely dispersed across stocks within the same market, implying that the burden to adjust
to exchange rates is a stock specific effect, and not a market-wide effect. Third, the ψ
estimates in Figure 1.3 rarely lie close to the 45 degree line, implying that the NYSE and
home burden to adjust to exchange rates is similar only in rare cases. Fourth, the
dispersion of the ψ estimates in Figure 1.3 widens during the high exchange rate volatility
period within each market. The increased dispersion may be attributable to increased
dispersion in stock specific characteristics such as bid-ask spreads and trading volume,
but also may be attributable to the dramatic rise in exchange rate volatility.10 And, fifth,
the NYSE bears less of the exchange rate burden for a substantial number of firms.
Specifically, 21 of the 46 points (46%) lie above the 45 degree line in the low exchange
rate volatility period, and 19 of the 46 points (41%) lie above the 45 degree line in the

9

 HOME , E is the response of the home stock price to a 1-unit shock in the home price of one U.S. dollar (

EH /US ), and  NYSE , E is the response of the New York price to a 1-unit shock in EH /US . A 1-unit shock in
EH /US implies a depreciation (appreciation) of the home (U.S. dollar) currency versus the U.S. dollar (home
currency). Therefore, in response to the EH /US shock, we should expect the home exchange price to rise,
ˆ HOME , E  0, and/or the New York price to fall ˆ NYSE , E  0 to meet the new equilibrium price.
10

Sample-wide medians presented in Tables 1.1 – 1.3 indicate trading volume and cost variables are fairly
stable between the two exchange rate periods.
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high exchange rate volatility period. This finding contrasts others that claim that the
NYSE should bear all of the exchange rate burden.
The results show that both price series respond to exchange rate shocks. In order
to compare the magnitudes of the  HOME , E and  NYSE , E estimates, I perform likelihood
ratio tests to test the null hypothesis that  HOME , E =  NYSE ,E . The null hypothesis of
equality of the two psi estimates is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for 34
(36) of the 46 firms during the period of low (high) exchange rate volatility. Of the 34
significant differences during the period of low exchange rate volatility, 14 are positive
and 20 are negative. Of the 36 significant differences during the period of high exchange
rate volatility, 13 are positive and 23 are negative. Also, when averaging over the total
sample of 46 cross-listings, I conducted a paired t-test that controls for cross-correlation
in the psi estimates. The t-statistic for equality of sample-wide averages,

 HOME , E   NYSE , E  0 , equals -1.84 (p-value = 0.072) for the period of high exchange
rate volatility, equals -1.72 (p-value = 0.092) for the period of low exchange rate
volatility, and equals -2.49 (p-value = 0.014) when combining both periods. A negative
difference indicates that the NYSE burden ( NYSE , E ) to adjust to exchange rates is larger
in magnitude than the home exchange burden ( HOME , E ).
In Figure 1.4, I compare the combined markets’ burden to adjust to exchange rate
shocks during the low versus the high exchange rate volatility periods. The sum of

 HOME , E and  NYSE , E measures the combined burden of the home market and the NYSE
to adjust to exchange rates. In Figure 1.4, for each firm the sum of  HOME , E and  NYSE , E
for the low exchange rate volatility period is graphed on the Y-axis, and the same sum
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calculated for the high exchange rate volatility period is graphed on the X-axis. Points
that lie below the 45 degree line signify firms that experienced an increase in the
combined markets’ burden to adjust to exchange rates during the period of high exchange
rate volatility.
As illustrated in Figure 1.4, the overall burden of adjusting to exchange rate
shocks (the sum of ˆ HOME , E and the absolute value of ˆ NYSE , E ) increased during the period
of high exchange rate volatility for the majority of firms. Specifically, the overall burden
rose for 31 of the 46 firms, (t-statistic for difference of percentage from 50% equals
2.52). Therefore, the dramatic rise in exchange rate volatility had a likewise dramatic
effect on the combined burdens of stock prices in the two markets to adjust to exchange
rate shocks.
Results of the TRP tests are reported in Tables 1.4 – 1.6, for Canada, Brazil, and
Mexico, respectively. For the Canadian results in Table 1.4, the mean (median) TRP
equals 59% (69%) versus 62% (71%) for the period of low versus high exchange rate
volatility. The coefficients exhibit wide cross-sectional variation, with a standard
deviation of 0.27 for the period of low exchange rate volatility, and 0.32 for the period of
high exchange rate volatility. The NYSE burden exceeds the home burden for 65% (61%)
of the sample during the period of low (high) exchange rate volatility. Both percentages
significantly exceed 50% (t-statistics for difference from 50% equal 3.42 and 2.33,
respectively). And, the psi estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level in nearly
every case. These results confirm that, while the NYSE bore more of the burden, both
markets bore significant burdens to adjust to exchange rate shocks. In contrast, Grammig
et al. (2005) and Frijns et al. (2010) claim that the foreign market bears nearly all the
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burden of adjustment to exchange rate changes. My tests show that these earlier claims
are sample specific, and, therefore, the generalizations are misleading. When examining a
more robust set of firms, I find that the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rates is not
borne primarily by the foreign market.
Results for the Brazilian sample differ markedly from the Canadian results. For
the Brazilian results in Table 1.5, the mean (median) TRP equals 44% (44%) versus 47%
(50%) when comparing the periods of low versus high exchange rate volatility.11 Relative
to the Canadian results, the TRPs are more closely clustered (standard deviations of 0.11
and 0.24 for the periods of low and high exchange rate volatility, respectively). Thus,
there is considerably more homogeneity among the TRPs for the Brazilian sample versus
the Canadian sample. The NYSE burden exceeds the home burden only 23% of the time
during the period of low exchange rate volatility (significantly less than 50%; t-statistic
for difference from 50% equals -5.47). This percentage rises to 51% during the period of
high exchange rate volatility. The Brazilian results indicate that, relative to BOVESPA
prices, NYSE prices bear far less of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks during
the low exchange rate volatility period, but that the burden was fairly evenly shared
during the high exchange rate volatility period. It should be noted that most of the psi
estimates are significant at the 5% level in each period, once again implying that both
markets bore at least part of the exchange rate burden.
The Mexican sample results are reported in Table 1.6. The mean (median) TRP
equals 61% (62%) versus 57% (57%) for the periods of low versus high exchange rate
11

Cosan Limited offers an interesting case study. From Table 1.5, it is clear that most trading in Cosan
shares takes place on the NYSE. Not surprisingly, the burden of Cosan share prices to adjust to exchange
rate shocks lies with the BOVESPA. It is likely that the BOVESPA lags the NYSE for changes in Cosan’s
prices related to price shocks either due to changes in fundamentals of Cosan, or to changes in exchange
rates.
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volatility. The Mexican results exhibit more homogeneity than the Canadian results
(standard deviation approximately 0.20 in each period). The NYSE burden exceeds the
home burden 70% of the time during the low exchange rate volatility period
(significantly greater than 50%; t-statistic for difference from 50% equals 3.01), and 60%
of the time during the high exchange rate volatility period (t-statistic for difference from
50% equals 1.32). In general, tests on Mexican cross-listings show that the NYSE
investor bears more of the exchange rate burden than the home investor. Summary
statistics for the TRP estimates for the three markets are provided in Table 1.7.
1.4.F. Cross-Sectional TRP Tests
Table 1.8 reports averages for quintile portfolios formed based on TRP (the translation
risk percentage defined in Equation (1.12), which measures the relative burden of the
NYSE price to adjust to exchange rate shocks. Quintile 1 consists of the lowest TRP
quintile, and quintile 5 consists of the largest TRP quintile. NYSE % Volume of Total
equals the trading volume in USD divided by the sum of the USD denominated trading
volume on both the NYSE and home exchange. The Cost Ratio equals the percentage
bid-ask quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage bid-ask quote
spread on the NYSE. Size equals total assets in thousands USD. Emerging equals the
percentage of the group consisting of emerging market stocks. While small sample
caveats are in order, it is important to note that my sample size is among the largest of
any high frequency price discovery study.
The quintile results reveal interesting monotonic patterns. The NYSE’s relative
share of total trading volume generally falls from TRP quintile 1 through TRP quintile 5.
The Cost Ratio also follows a near monotonic relationship with the TRP quintiles.
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Although not as clear, size is larger for the higher TRP quintiles than for the lower TPR
quintiles. If size is a proxy for familiarity, then our results suggest that the NYSE share of
the exchange rate burden is higher for the more familiar firms. The final column shows
that TRP quintile 5 consists mainly of Canadian stocks (the emerging market composition
in quintile 5 is well below 50%). In summary, the results show that the NYSE share of
the exchange rate burden tends to be higher for larger firms, and for those with lower
trading volumes on the NYSE relative to the home market, and lower costs on the home
exchange relative to the NYSE.
I also run cross-sectional regressions of TRP against NYSE % of Total Volume,
Cost Ratio, and the natural logarithm of total assets. The regressions are run individually
to avoid multicollinearity problems that exist especially between COST and VOL. The
regressions pool the data across both time periods, and include an interaction dummy
variable to measure changes in slopes between the low and high exchange rate volatility
periods.
Results are consistent with the quintile results. The VOL slope coefficient is
significant at the 0.05 level, and COST and SIZE slope coefficients are significant at the
0.10 level. The signs of the slopes are consistent with the quintile results; namely that
TRP is negatively related to both VOL and COST, and is positively related to SIZE.
Slope coefficients intensify during the period of high exchange rate volatility (i.e., the
signs on the interaction terms are identical to the variable’s coefficients), however, the
interaction term coefficients are not statistically significant.
1.5.

Conclusions

In this study, I examined the informational role of exchange rates in the price formation
process. I developed a 3-system vector moving average model to measure the market
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price impacts of exchange rate shocks. Using a sample of 46 cross-listings on the NYSE
from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico during 2008, I found that New York prices bore
roughly 60% of the adjustment to exchange rates for Canadian and Mexican securities,
and roughly 45% for Brazilian securities. These findings showed that price adjustments
from exchange rate shocks transpired on both the home exchange and the NYSE.
Therefore, it is not the case that foreign prices (e.g., NYSE prices) bear nearly all the
burden to adjust to exchange rates, as suggested in existing studies that examine less
diverse sets of stocks and markets.
Findings varied considerably across firms, indicating that the effects of exchange
rate shocks are not market-based, but more likely are firm-specific. For the majority of
firms, the combined markets’ burdens to adjust to exchange rate shocks rose during the
period of high exchange rate volatility. This finding suggests that traditional price
discovery measures such as Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares become increasingly
affected by exchange rate effects versus firm-specific fundamental news effects during
periods of increasing exchange rate volatility.
Cross-sectional tests revealed that the NYSE burden to adjust to exchange rate
changes is highest for big firms, and for those with relatively low NYSE trading volume,
or with high NYSE trading costs. The findings indicate that the burden to adjust to
exchange rates is likely to shift more to emerging market exchanges as the migration of
trading volume to the NYSE increases. The results also have important implications for
international price discovery tests, especially for those that fail to model an independent
role for exchange rates at the firm level.
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Table 1.1
Canadian Sample Summary
This table lists the Canadian companies by name, industry, NYSE listing date, relative trading volume, cost, and size. The low
exchange rate volatility period (Low Vol) spans all trading days in January 1, 2008 – September 14, 2008. The high exchange
rate volatility period (High Vol) spans all trading days in September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008. September 15, 2008 is the
date of the Lehman Brother. bankruptcy declaration and the start of market turmoil and volatility.
NYSE % Volume of Total
Company

Indus try

Brookfield As s et Management Inc

Financial

Bank of Montreal

Lis ting Date

Cos t Ratio

Total As s ets
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Low Vol

High Vol

Low Vol

High Vol

7/10/1998

0.3360

0.3804

1.1040

0.8152

U.S. $000
57430

Banking

10/5/2005

0.0805

0.0715

0.6086

0.4478

366538

Bank of Nova Scotia

Banking

1/2/1996

0.0737

0.0507

0.5815

0.4143

449944

Brookfield Properties Corp

Real Es tate

1/2/1996

0.6240

0.6728

1.4088

1.0432

20391

Biovail Corporation International

Pharmaceuticals

6/2/1999

0.3625

0.3074

1.1755

1.1456

1732

Celes tica Inc.

Electronics Manufacturing

5/10/2000

0.3844

0.2965

1.1867

1.1974

4457

Canadian Imperial Bank

Banking

7/1/1998

0.0764

0.0814

0.5530

0.4541

330593

Canadian Natural Res ources Limited

Oil and Gas

1/2/1996

0.2657

0.2185

0.8285

0.5369

37576

Canadian Pacific Railway

Trans portation

2/1/2003

0.2604

0.3284

0.7976

0.7224

13292

Enbridge Inc.

Oil and Gas

1/2/1996

0.1578

0.1738

0.7178

0.5462

20215

Fairfax Financial

Ins urance

6/6/1997

0.3616

0.2812

0.8904

0.5605

27565

Gildan ActiveWear

Apparel

10/30/2001

0.3290

0.3586

1.0177

0.9185

8670

Gains co

Ins urance

7/23/1996

0.4181

0.3560

1.0523

0.8650

1053

Manulife Financial

Financial Services

6/10/1998

0.1777

0.1313

0.9005

0.5501

350553

Nova Chemicals

Chemicals

7/31/1996

0.4185

0.3724

1.0238

0.8567

4914

Northern Telecom

Switching equipment

3/9/1996

0.4589

0.3033

1.1744

0.7102

16315

Nexen Inc

Oil and Gas

7/11/1998

0.2071

0.2030

0.8866

0.6019

19731

Ritchie Brothers Auctioners

Indus trial Equipment

1/1/1996

0.6341

0.5499

1.6196

1.5255

841

Sun Life Financial

Ins urance

11/14/2000

0.1518

0.1028

0.7054

0.5585

184485

Toronto Dominion Bank

Banking

11/14/2002

0.1641

0.1084

0.8538

0.5283

497902

Tim Hortons Inc

Res taurant

1/2/1996

0.3509

0.3437

1.2430

0.9756

1737

Trans Canada Pipeline

Oil and Gas

8/30/1996

0.0846

0.1093

0.6679

0.5258

31022

Domtar Corporation

Paper Products

3/22/2006

0.7798

0.8917

1.8711

2.0779

7631

Averages

0.3112

0.2910

0.9943

0.8077

106721

Medians

0.3290

0.2965

0.9005

0.7102

20215

Table 1.2
Brazilian Sample Summary
This table lists the Brazilian companies by name, industry, and NYSE listing date and relative trading volume, cost, and price
characteristics. NYSE % Volume of Total is trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the USD denominated
trading volume on both the NYSE and the BOVESPA. The percentage bid-ask quote equals the ask price minus the bid price,
divided by the midpoint of the two prices. The percentage bid-ask quote is calculated for every 1-minute interval, for each
stock. For each minute, the Cost Ratio equals the percentage quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage
quote spread on the NYSE. To calculate the exchange rate adjusted home stock price quote, for each minute, the midpoint of
the 1-minute exchange rate bid and ask price quotes is multiplied times the midpoint of the home stock bid and ask price.
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Company
Braskem
Companhia Brasil de Distribuição
SABESP
Comp Energetica de Minas Gerais
Compania Paranaense de Energia
Cosan Limited
CPFL Energia
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica
Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A.
Gafisa
GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes
TAM-Companhia de Investimentos em Transportes
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes
Averages
Medians

Industry
Listing Date
Chemicals
8/31/2002
Food
5/31/1997
Utilities
5/10/2002
Energy
8/16/1996
Energy
7/30/1997
Sugar/Ethanol
8/14/2007
Energy
1/2/1996
Aerospace
7/18/2000
Paper
4/8/2000
Home Construction
3/14/2007
Airline
6/23/2004
Airline
3/9/2006
Telecomm
11/18/1998

NYSE % Volume of Total
Low Vol
High Vol
0.1906
0.2166
0.4332
0.4497
0.5414
0.5577
0.3099
0.3360
0.2626
0.2578
0.9035
0.9523
0.3504
0.2548
0.5701
0.6092
0.4921
0.4882
0.4664
0.4356
0.3864
0.3262
0.4172
0.4000
0.3909
0.4390
0.4396
0.4402
0.4172
0.4356

Cost Ratio
Total Assets
Low Vol High Vol
U.S. $000
1.3098
1.2438
12283
2.2395
1.7960
7475
1.8387
1.6929
10854
1.7451
1.2880
14160
1.7470
1.1841
7295
11.7228 11.3670
5187
1.2416
0.9679
9081
2.6192
2.4402
8412
2.4164
2.0543
6806
1.5705
1.3019
2039
1.5344
1.3071
3032
1.9120
1.8008
3762
2.3988
1.8888
18243
2.6381
2.3333
8356
1.8387
1.6929
7475

Table 1.3
Mexican Sample Summary
This table lists the Mexican companies by name, industry, and NYSE listing date and relative trading volume, cost, and price
characteristics. NYSE % Volume of Total is trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the USD denominated trading
volume on both the NYSE and the BOLSA. The percentage bid-ask quote equals the ask price minus the bid price, divided by the
midpoint of the two prices. The percentage bid-ask quote is calculated for every 1-minute interval, for each stock. For each minute, the
Cost Ratio equals the percentage quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage quote spread on the NYSE. To calculate
the exchange rate adjusted home stock price quote, for each minute, the midpoint of the 1-minute exchange rate bid and ask price quotes is
multiplied times the midpoint of the home stock bid and ask price.
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Company
America Movil
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste
Cemex
Fomento Economico Mexicano
Grupo Simec
Desarrolladora Homex
Industrias Bachoco
Empresas ICA
Coca Cola Femsa
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico
Averages
Medians

Industry
Telecomm
Industrials
Building Materials
Beverage
Mining and Metals
Housing
Food
Construction
Beverage
Transportation

Listing Date
1/2/1996
2/26/2006
1/1/1996
5/9/1998
1/2/1996
6/29/2004
9/22/1997
1/2/1996
1/2/1996
1/2/1996

NYSE % Volume of Total
Low Vol
High Vol
0.5058
0.4805
0.6110
0.5745
0.5441
0.4888
0.5983
0.5773
0.4572
0.4142
0.5713
0.5779
0.9216
0.7439
0.1365
0.1118
0.8549
0.7909
0.5558
0.6467
0.5757
0.5407
0.5635
0.5759

Cost Ratio
Low Vol High Vol
2.5064
1.8084
1.6153
1.4894
2.9486
1.9905
2.4943
1.9159
2.2429
1.9072
1.9893
1.5985
3.7120
3.0723
1.2711
0.8974
4.2788
3.4877
2.2931
3.2372
2.5352
2.1404
2.3937
1.9115

Total Assets
U.S. $000
33540
1593
51063
15965
2433
2407
1834
3967
8320
2628
12375
3298

Table 1.4
Exchange Rate Effects for the Canadian Sample
This table reports cointegrating vector coefficients and permanent foreign exchange impulse response coefficients for the Canadian stock
sample. The ψHOME,E (ψNYSE,E) columns present impulse response coefficients measuring the effect that U.S. dollar to Canadian dollar
exchange rate changes have on the TSE (NYSE) price of each stock. The TRP column presents the translation risk percent equal to the
absolute value of the ψNYSE,E estimate divided by the sum of the estimates of ψHOME,E and absolute value ψNYSE,E. The final column presents
differences in TRPs for the periods of high versus low exchange rate volatility.
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Company Name
Brookfield Asset Mgmt
Bank of Montreal
Bank of Nova Scotia
Brookfield Properties
Biovail Corporation Int'l
Celestica Inc.
Canadian Imperial Bank
Canadian Natural Resources
Canadian Pacific Railway
Enbridge
Fairfax Financial
Gildan ActiveWear
Gainsco
Manulife Financial
Nova Chemicals
Northern Telecom
Nexen Inc
Ritchie Brothers Auctioners
Sun Life Financial
Toronto Dominion Bank
Tim Hortons Inc
TransCanada Pipeline
Domtar Corporation
Averages
Medians

Low Vol
Cointegrating Vector
ψHOME,E
1 -0.9995 -1.0025
0.1068
1 -1.0000 -0.9998
0.1244
1 -1.0000 -1.0007
0.0674
1 -1.0000 -0.9994
0.5495
1 -1.0000 -0.9994
0.4757
1 -1.0001 -1.0008
0.6717
1 -1.0000 -1.0005
0.1946
1 -1.0000 -0.9997
0.1751
1 -1.0000 -1.0004
0.4497
1 -1.0000 -0.9997
0.1933
1 -1.0000 -0.9920
0.3865
1 -1.0000 -1.0001
0.1263
1 -1.0000 -1.0028
0.7518
1 -1.0000 -1.0012
0.4988
1 -1.0000 -0.9979
0.3715
1 -1.0000 -0.9975
0.7571
1 -1.0000 -1.0020
0.0920
1 -1.0000 -0.9982
0.1217
1 -1.0000 -1.0005
0.1809
1 -1.0000 -0.9997
0.2365
1 -1.0000 -0.9987
0.4018
1 -1.0000 -1.0000
0.0911
1 -1.0000 -1.0009
0.6204
1 -1.0000 -0.9998
0.3324
1 -1.0000 -1.0000
0.2365

ψNYSE,E
-0.7933
-0.7214
-0.6660
-0.2947
-0.3525
-0.2287
-0.5038
-0.6906
-0.2714
-0.4593
-0.5468
-0.7810
-0.0529
-0.1595
-0.4628
-0.1284
-0.8156
-0.8028
-0.6515
-0.5363
-0.4292
-0.6828
-0.2641
-0.4911
-0.5038

TRP
0.8814
0.8529
0.9081
0.3491
0.4256
0.2540
0.7213
0.7977
0.3763
0.7039
0.5859
0.8608
0.0657
0.2423
0.5547
0.1450
0.8986
0.8683
0.7827
0.6939
0.5165
0.8823
0.2986
0.5942
0.6939

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

High Vol
Cointegrating Vector
ψHOME,E
-1.0000
-1.0005
0.7081
-0.9998
-1.0045
0.0867
-0.9999
-1.0020
0.1571
-0.9998
-1.0019
0.7139
-1.0002
-1.0013
0.5312
-0.9998
-1.0015
0.3014
-0.9996
-1.0043
0.0000
-1.0000
-1.0000
0.6640
-1.0000
-0.9988
0.4485
-1.0002
-0.9990
0.0853
-0.9994
-1.0094
0.0672
-1.0002
-0.9959
0.8476
-0.9997
-0.9925
0.7941
-0.9998
-1.0051
0.2555
-1.0001
-0.9959
0.1016
-1.0053
-0.9291
0.0358
-1.0000
-1.0033
0.0879
-0.9999
-1.0017
0.2015
-1.0000
-0.9989
0.3173
-0.9999
-1.0031
0.4287
-0.9999
-1.0006
0.1416
-1.0001
-1.0017
0.1989
-1.0003
-0.9952
0.7485
-1.0002
-0.9977
0.3444
-1.0000
-1.0013
0.2555

ψNYSE,E
-0.1002
-0.8924
-0.7857
-0.1113
-0.3712
-0.7050
-1.0000
-0.2146
-0.4386
-0.7347
-0.9502
-0.1141
-0.1256
-0.6254
-0.8933
-0.9125
-0.8687
-0.7829
-0.6776
-0.3619
-0.8104
-0.7724
-0.2441
-0.5866
-0.7050

TRP
0.1240
0.9114
0.8334
0.1349
0.4113
0.7005
1.0000
0.2443
0.4944
0.8959
0.9340
0.1186
0.1366
0.7100
0.8979
0.9622
0.9081
0.7953
0.6811
0.4577
0.8513
0.7952
0.2459
0.6193
0.7100

High minus
Low
-0.7574
0.0585
-0.0748
-0.2142
-0.0143
0.4465
0.2787
-0.5535
0.1181
0.1921
0.3481
-0.7421
0.0708
0.4676
0.3432
0.8172
0.0095
-0.0730
-0.1016
-0.2362
0.3348
-0.0871
-0.0527
0.0251
0.0161

All underlined coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level. All non-underlined coefficients are significant at the 5% level.

Table 1.5
Exchange Rate Effects for the Brazilian Sample
This table reports cointegrating vector coefficients and permanent foreign exchange impulse response coefficients for the Brazilian stock
sample. The ψHOME,E (ψNYSE,E) columns present impulse response coefficients measuring the effect that U.S. dollar to Brazilian real
exchange rate changes have on the BOVESPA (NYSE) price of each stock. The TRP column presents the translation risk percent equal to
the absolute value of the ψNYSE,E estimate divided by the sum of the estimates of ψHOME,E and absolute value ψNYSE,E. TRP equals the
adjustment borne by the NYSE relative to the total adjustment from both markets in response to changes in the U.S. dollar to Brazilian real
exchange rate. The final column presents differences in TRPs for the periods of high versus low exchange rate volatility.
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Company Name
Braskem
Companhia Brasil de Distribuição
SABESP
Comp Energetica de Minas Gerais
Compania Paranaense de Energia
Cosan Limited
CPFL Energia
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica
Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A.
Gafisa
GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes
TAM-Companhia de Investimentos em Transp.
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Low Vol
Cointegrating Vector ψHOME,E
-1.0011 -0.9970
0.2308
-0.9992 -1.0055
0.3736
-1.0005 -0.9973
0.3608
-0.9989 -1.0054
0.2791
-0.9998 -1.0033
0.2982
-1.0027 -0.9822
0.5516
-0.9997 -1.0019
0.3519
-0.9988 -1.0065
0.4219
-1.0004 -0.9984
0.3851
-0.9995 -1.0016
0.3781
-0.9989 -1.0063
0.4081
-0.9996 -1.0005
0.3738
-1.0006 -0.9963
0.3466

Averages
Medians

1
1

-1.0000
-0.9997

-1.0002
-1.0016

0.3661
0.3736

ψNYSE,E
-0.4546
-0.2573
-0.3082
-0.3283
-0.3486
-0.1814
-0.3155
-0.1654
-0.2491
-0.2914
-0.2544
-0.3091
-0.2665

TRP
0.6633
0.4079
0.4607
0.5405
0.5390
0.2475
0.4727
0.2816
0.3928
0.4353
0.3840
0.4527
0.4346

Cointegrating Vector
1 -1.0012 -0.9966
1 -1.0000 -0.9997
1 -1.0006 -0.9987
1 -0.9997 -1.0003
1 -1.0037 -0.9894
1 -0.9874 -1.0945
1 -1.0028 -0.9926
1 -0.9976 -1.0066
1 -1.0005 -0.9958
1 -1.0007 -0.9984
1 -1.0030 -0.9976
1 -1.0011 -0.9948
1 -0.9998 -1.0019

-0.2869
-0.2914

0.4394
0.4353

1
1

-0.9998
-1.0006

-1.0051
-0.9984

High Vol
ψHOME,E
0.1660
0.2526
0.3035
0.1940
0.1605
1.0000
0.3283
0.4206
0.3575
0.5481
0.5072
0.2853
0.4626

ψNYSE,E
-0.5873
-0.3669
-0.4036
-0.4058
-0.6010
0.0000
-0.3352
-0.2248
-0.3562
-0.1566
-0.1464
-0.4518
-0.0492

TRP
0.7797
0.5923
0.5708
0.6765
0.7892
0.0000
0.5052
0.3483
0.4991
0.2222
0.2239
0.6130
0.0962

High minus
Low
0.1164
0.1844
0.1102
0.1360
0.2502
-0.2475
0.0325
0.0667
0.1063
-0.2131
-0.1600
0.1603
-0.3384

0.3836
0.3283

-0.3142
-0.3562

0.4551
0.5052

0.0157
0.0699

All underlined coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level. All non-underlined coefficients are significant at the 5% level.

Table 1.6
Exchange Rate Effects for the Mexican Sample
This table reports cointegrating vector coefficients and permanent foreign exchange impulse response coefficients for the Mexican stock
sample. The ψHOME,E (ψNYSE,E) columns present impulse response coefficients measuring the effect that U.S. dollar to Mexican peso
exchange rate changes have on the BOLSA (NYSE) price of each stock. The TRP column presents the translation risk percent equal to the
absolute value of the ψNYSE,E estimate divided by the sum of the estimates of ψHOME,E and absolute value ψNYSE,E. TRP equals the
adjustment borne by the NYSE relative to the total adjustment from both markets in response to changes in the U.S. dollar to Mexican
peso exchange rate. The final column presents differences in TRPs for the periods of high versus low exchange rate volatility.

Company Name
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America Movil
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste
Cemex
Fomento Economico Miexicano
Grupo Simec
Desarrolladora Homex
Industrias Bachoco
Empresas ICA
Coca Cola Femsa
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico
Averages
Medians

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Low Vol
Cointegrating Vector
ψHOME,E
-0.9961 -1.0019
0.2869
-1.0061 -0.9961
0.4787
-1.0039 -0.9989
0.6997
-0.9994 -1.0004
0.2725
-0.9987 -1.0024
0.1562
-0.9986 -1.0015
0.5517
-0.9718 -1.0108
0.4268
-0.9982 -1.0019
0.1047
-0.9988 -1.0011
0.5365
-0.9989 -1.0012
0.3446
-0.9971 -1.0016
0.3858
-0.9988 -1.0013
0.3857

ψNYSE,E
-0.6906
-0.5078
-0.2852
-0.7150
-0.8395
-0.4242
-0.5921
-0.8923
-0.4634
-0.6567
-0.6067
-0.6244

TRP
0.7065
0.5148
0.2896
0.7241
0.8431
0.4347
0.5811
0.8950
0.4634
0.6558
0.6108
0.6185

Cointegrating Vector
1 -0.9943 -1.0020
1 -0.9973 -1.0011
1 -0.9985 -0.9996
1 -0.9963 -1.0018
1 -0.9956 -1.0042
1 -0.9996 -1.0010
1 -0.9873 -1.0020
1 -0.9978 -1.0015
1 -0.9933 -1.0049
1 -1.0048 -0.9983
1 -0.9965 -1.0016
1 -0.9968 -1.0016

High Vol
ψHOME,E
0.1765
0.6800
0.3548
0.2267
0.2690
0.5275
0.4883
0.1301
0.6724
0.5372
0.4063
0.4215

ψNYSE,E
-0.7090
-0.2089
-0.5883
-0.7199
-0.7375
-0.3624
-0.5126
-0.8590
-0.3303
-0.3737
-0.5401
-0.5504

TRP
0.8006
0.2350
0.6238
0.7605
0.7327
0.4072
0.5122
0.8685
0.3294
0.4102
0.5680
0.5680

All underlined coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level. All non-underlined coefficients are significant at the 5% level.

Table 1.7
Summary Statistics for the NYSE Translation Risk Percentage
This table reports means, standard deviations (sd), interquartile ranges (iqr), and quartile
results for TRPs for the sample of cross-listings from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. TRP
equals the burden of New York prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks expressed as a
percent of the total burden of the NYSE and home market burdens. Results are presented
separately for the period of low exchange rate volatility (January 1, 2008 – September 14,
2008) and high exchange rate volatility (September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008).
Country
Canada
Canada

Period
Low
High

Mean Median
0.5942 0.6939
0.6193 0.7100

min
0.0657
0.1186

p25
0.3491
0.2459

p75
0.8608
0.8979

max
0.9081
1.0000

iqr
0.5117
0.6520

sd
0.2727
0.3158

N
23
23

Brazil
Brazil

Low
High

0.4394
0.4551

0.4353
0.5052

0.2475
0.0000

0.3928
0.2239

0.4727
0.6130

0.6633
0.7892

0.0799
0.3890

0.1080
0.2362

13
13

Mexico
Mexico
All Countries
All Countries

Low
High
Low
High

0.6108
0.5680
0.5540
0.5649

0.6185
0.5680
0.5278
0.6026

0.2896
0.2350
0.0657
0.0962

0.4634
0.4072
0.3928
0.3294

0.7241
0.7605
0.7241
0.7953

0.8950
0.8685
0.9081
1.0000

0.2606
0.3533
0.3313
0.4659

0.1900
0.2194
0.2281
0.2785

10
10
46
46
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Table 1.8
TRP Quintile Summary Statistics
This table reports averages for quintile portfolios formed based on TRPs, defined as the
NYSE share of the exchange rate burden. Quintile 1 consists of the lowest TRP quintile,
and quintile 5 consists of the largest TRP quintile. NYSE % Volume of Total Vol is
trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the USD denominated trading
volume on both the NYSE and the home exchange. The Cost Ratio equals the percentage
quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage quote spread on the
NYSE. Size equals total assets in thousands USD. Emerging equals the percentage of the
group consisting of emerging market stocks.
Panel A. January 1, 2008 - September 14, 2008
NYSE %
Cost
Group
TRP of Total Vol
Ratio
1
0.24
0.40
2.23
2
0.42
0.40
1.30
3
0.52
0.38
1.40
4
0.72
0.28
1.05
5
0.88
0.16
0.93
Panel B. September 15, 2008 - December 31, 2008
NYSE %
Cost
Group
TRP of Total Vol
Ratio
1
0.16
0.49
1.71
2
0.37
0.50
1.30
3
0.60
0.42
1.17
4
0.78
0.31
0.89
5
0.91
0.22
0.58
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Size
14,313
6,532
8,735
126,132
104,508

Emerging
0.33
0.78
0.70
0.44
0.22

Size
13,175
61,064
27,129
95,196
81,991

Emerging
0.56
0.44
0.80
0.56
0.11

Table 1.9
TRP Regressions
This table reports results of cross-sectional regressions of TRP against trading volume,
trading costs, and firm size. TRP equals the NYSE share of the exchange rate burden.
VOL equals the dollar trading volume expressed in USD on the NYSE divided by the
USD denominated trading volume on both the NYSE and the home exchange. COST
equals the percentage quote spread on the home exchange divided by the percentage
quote spread on the NYSE. Size equals total assets in thousands USD. D is a dummy
variable equal to zero for TRPs derived from January 1, 2008 – September 14, 2008, and
equal to one for TRPs derived from September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008.
Panel A. Volume
Intercept
D
Vol
Vol × D

Estimate
0.7458
0.0738
-0.4746
-0.1808

t-statistic
10.49
0.75
-3.05
-0.83

p-value
0.00
0.46
0.00
0.41

Estimate
0.6313
0.0231
-0.0559
-0.0229

t-statistic
11.79
0.32
-1.94
-0.55

p-value
0.00
0.75
0.06
0.59

Estimate
0.1623
-0.0408
0.0416
0.0057

t-statistic
0.77
-0.14
1.89
0.18

p-value
0.44
0.89
0.06
0.86

Panel B. Cost
Intercept
D
COST
COST × D
Panel C. Firm Size
Intercept
D
ln(SIZE)
ln(SIZE ) × D
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Figure 1.1
Exchange Rates
Panel A. The Canadian Dollar to U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate
1.35
1.3

1.25
1.2

1.15
1.1
1.05

1
0.95
0.9

Panel B. The Brazilian Real to U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate
2.7
2.5
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.5
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Figure 1.1, continued
Panel C. The Mexican Peso to U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate

Figure 1.1 plots midpoint of daily quotes for exchange rates
relative to the U.S. dollar for the Canadian dollar, Brazilian
real, and Mexican peso, during 2008.
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Figure 1.2
Impulse Response Functions
Panel A. IRFs derived from trading days spanning January 1, 2008 – September 12, 2008

Figure 1.2 show impulse response functions (IRFs) are presented for three stocks in each
market. Each IRF illustrates the response of each price series to a 1-time, 1-unit increase
to the home currency to U.S. dollar exchange rate (i.e., an appreciation of the U.S. dollar
relative to the home currency). Each IRF extends 500 steps ahead. Each step represents 1
minute. The left side panel presents IRFs for stocks with the smallest translation risk
percentage (TRP) within Brazil, Mexico, and Canada, respectively. The middle panel
presents IRFs for stocks with the median TRP within each market. The right side panel
presents IRFs for stocks with the largest TRP within each market. TRP equals the burden
of the NYSE price to adjust to changes in exchange rates, relative to the combined
adjustment of the NYSE and home exchanges.
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Figure 1.3
Plot of ˆ HOME , E versus ˆ NYSE , E

All Firms Low Volatility Period

All Firms High Volatility Period

Canada Low Volatility Period

Canada High Volatility Period
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Figure 1.3, continued

Brazil Low Volatility Period

Brazil High Volatility Period

Mexico Low Volatility Period

Mexico High Volatility Period

Figure 1.3 plots ˆ HOME , E versus ˆ NYSE , E , which are the permanent impulse
response estimates for the home exchange price and the NYSE price,
respectively, to a 1-unit shock in the home currency to U.S. dollar exchange
rate. ˆ HOME , E is graphed on the Y-axis and ˆ NYSE , E is graphed on the X-axis.
The low exchange rate volatility period (Low Volatility Period) spans all
trading days in January 1, 2008 – September 14, 2008. The high exchange
rate volatility period (High Volatility Period) spans all trading days in
September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008. September 15, 2008 is the date
of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy declaration and the beginning of
extreme market turmoil and volatility.
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Figure 1.4
Combined Markets Burden to Adjust to Exchange Rates

Figure 1.4 plots the paired coordinates for the combined markets’ burdens to adjust
to exchange rates for the sampled 46 cross-listings. The combined burden equals the
sum of ˆ HOME , E plus ˆ NYSE , E . Paired coordinates are graphed for the combined burden
during the low exchange rate volatility period (January 1, 2008 – September 14,
2008) on the Y-axis versus the combined burden during the high exchange rate
volatility period (September 15, 2008 – December 31, 2008) on the X-axis. Points
lying below the 45 degree line correspond to firms that experienced an increase in
the burden of their prices to adjust to exchange rates during the high volatility period
versus the low volatility period.
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CHAPTER 2
MARKET DOMINANCE AND PRICE DISCOVERY

One of the most basic principles of finance asserts that asset prices depend on market
characteristics that affect demand and supply. In the finance literature, price discovery
refers to the study of how prices are formed through the interactions of demand and
supply characteristics in specific markets.12 For example, many academic studies
examine stocks that trade in multiple markets to identify the market that contributes the
most to price discovery. And, more importantly, studies of cross-listings examine
competing characteristics of the home versus foreign markets to identify key
determinants of price discovery.
Studies of cross-listed stocks show that the home market dominates the price
discovery process. Hypotheses have been offered to explain why the home market
contributes the most to the price discovery process. One argument is that the home
investors have an informational advantage so that price discovery is linked to the
proximity of information to the country exchange – a sort of trickle-down effect of
information first to the home market and then to the competing markets. An alternative
12

Price discovery is considered important enough to be hailed the “hallmark” feature of the NYSE's
centralized auction market by then CEO John Thain in a 2005 speech (Japan Society, September 2005).
Also, in his May 18, 2005 written testimony to the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee Hearing on Regulation NMS (Regulation National Market System), Mr. Thain commented on
the importance of the NYSE price discovery mechanism that: “offers superior market quality, and day after
day demonstrates its ability to out-perform purely electronic exchanges during opens and closes, order
imbalances and unforeseen, outside events” and that “creates the best prices on 89% of all trades compared
to other markets that compete for order flow in NYSE-listed stocks.”
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argument is that price discovery is related to trading and volume advantages of the home
market.
Despite the growing interest in price discovery for cross-listed stocks, conclusions
reached by most studies are limited. First, existing studies examine data limited to home
markets that maintain trading volume and cost advantages over competing markets.
Therefore, price discovery conclusions that home investors have an informational
advantage may merely be a manifestation of the dominance of home market
characteristics. Second, studies of price discovery for cross-listings characterize markets
solely on trading volume and cost. Effects of the price impacts of trades and exchange
rates are ignored. Third, price discovery tests have been limited to predominantly stable
market periods. Effects on price discovery during volatile market periods are unknown.
An objective of this study is to examine home markets that do not always
maintain trading cost and volume advantages over competing markets. For this purpose, I
examine cross-listings (ADRs) from Brazil and Mexico. For comparison purposes, I also
examine Canadian cross-listings. I show that the degree of dominance in market
characteristics differs distinctly across the three country exchanges. In contrast to existing
literature, I find that the home market is not always the price discovery leader.
A second objective of this study is to broaden the scope of variables used to
characterize markets, beyond trading volume and cost characteristics. For this purpose, I
introduce two new variables into the price discovery literature: the relative burden of
prices for each stock to adjust to exchange rate shocks, and differences in market depth
for each stock. I show that both variables significantly affect price discovery and
strengthen the ability to identify the primary market for each set of cross-listings.
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A third objective of this study is to examine price discovery during a market crisis
period. For this purpose, I choose the financial crisis that initiated in 2008. Specifically, I
conduct price discovery tests for the 4-month period May 2008 – August 2008 and for the
4-month period September 2008 – December 2008. I select equivalent 4-month periods
delineated by the September 2008 bankruptcy announcement by Lehman Brothers. A
chronology of the major financial events of 2008 is provided in Appendix 2.A. My tests
point to several significant changes in price discovery between the two periods.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed
in Section 1. Institutional details for the stock markets in Canada, Brazil, and Mexico are
discussed in Section 2. The details of the data and methodology are presented in Section
3. Testable propositions are presented in Section 4. Results are presented and discussed in
Section 5. Summarizing and concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
2.1.

Related Cross-Listing and Equity Price Discovery Literature

Cross-listings are instruments for foreign firms to list their stock outside their home
countries.13 Brazilian and Mexican stocks trade in the U.S. via indirect cross-listings as
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), whereas Canadian stocks trade in the U.S. as
direct cross-listings (ordinary share cross-listings).14
13

According to NYSE/Euronext, advantages of cross-listing include ease in raising capital, increasing
liquidity, improving visibility, building community, and rendering an IPO showcase. According to the
Bank of New York Melon, depository receipts can “broaden and diversify the issuer's shareholder base
with potentially greater liquidity, benefit share valuations and convey a global commitment.” See
https://europeanequities.nyx.com/en/listings and http://www.bnymellon.com/depositaryreceipts/index.html,
respectively. Many academic studies focus on these same issues. For example, Baker et al. (1998) show
that foreign firms cross-list to gain access to U.S. investors and to improve investor awareness of the firm.
For their sample of London-NYSE cross-listings, the authors find that analyst coverage and media attention
increases, and the cost of equity capital falls.
14

ADRs were established by JP Morgan in 1927 as a way for U.S. investors to make foreign investments.
Note that most firms cross-list in the U.S. via ADRs, which originate from many countries. In contrast,
direct cross-listings (not via ADRs) are mostly limited to Canadian and Israeli stocks. To list as an ordinary
share, firms must register with the SEC, comply with SEC regulations, and provide financial statements
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Levine and Schmukler (2003) and Gozzi et al. (2005) report how international
cross-listing boosts the total trading of international firms and assists the growth efforts
of the firm after internationalizing its trading. In addition, the authors show that most of
the increased trading activity occurs, not in the home market, but in the foreign markets.
Therefore, their research indicates that firms that cross-list internationally experience
significantly higher trading volume and that the lion’s share of the new trading volume
occurs internationally.
As multiple markets compete for order flow, traders (or trade orders) should
migrate towards the exchange with the lowest transactions costs, all else equal. As argued
by Aggarwal et al. (2007), as order flow migrates toward an exchange, informed traders
wanting to “camouflage” their private information also will migrate toward the exchange.
Therefore, price discovery should migrate towards the lower cost exchange where
informed traders initiate.
Early studies focused on prices of stocks trading on multiple national and regional
exchanges. In one of the early studies, Garbade and Silber (1979) find that regional
exchanges contribute to price discovery by offering information that is “relevant for
NYSE traders” (page 460). Consistent with Garbade and Silber’s findings, Mclnish and
Wood (1992) show that regional exchanges offer competition to the NYSE, forcing
tighter bid-ask spreads on the NYSE, and contributing to the price discovery process.
Schreiber and Schwartz (1985) describe price discovery as the adjustment of
prices toward changing equilibrium values. Deviations of actual prices from equilibrium
prices are pricing errors, and lead to use of error correction modeling. In a landmark
that comply with US GAAP. Further discussion of direct cross-listing requirements can be found in Karolyi
(1998).
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paper, Harris et al. (1995) use error correction models to examine the NYSE and regional
exchange listings of IBM and conclude that regional exchanges and the NYSE contribute
to the price discovery process for IBM. Therefore, their findings indicate that the NYSE
is not the sole source for price discovery. Specifically, the authors apply Gonzalo –
Granger (1995) permanent/transitory (PT) decomposition tests on error correction models
to estimate burdens of price adjustment on each exchange. The exchange with the larger
price adjustment burden is the subordinate or “satellite” exchange.
Hasbrouck (1995) also examines price discovery using an error correction model
as his starting point. In contrast to Harris et al. (1995, 2002), however, Hasbrouck derives
“information shares” for each firm for each exchange equal to the proportion of the
implicit equilibrium price variance attributable to the exchange. Hasbrouck studies the 30
Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks over the 3-month period August – October 1993,
and finds that the bulk of price discovery takes place on the NYSE. Later, Harris et al.
(2002) apply Gonzalo – Granger decomposition tests for significance of vector error
correction model adjustment factors for the 30 Dow Jones Industrial Average stocks. The
permanent component is associated with long-run prices and is the key focus of their
price discovery tests. They find that the dominance of the NYSE weakened over the 1988
– 1995 period.15 The Hasbrouck method often is referred to as the information share or IS
method. The Harris et al. method often is referred to as permanent/transitory or PT
15

Baillie et al. (2002) runs simulations comparing the results of the information share method to the
Gonzalo-Granger PT method, emphasizing that differences exist if random errors in the error correction
model are contemporaneously correlated across exchanges. Differences in the results are larger for lower
frequency trading intervals (e.g., more than 1 minute). Hasbrouck (2002) also offers simulations comparing
the Gonzalo-Granger PT and Hasbrouck IS methods, and shows that the minimum and maximum IS
bounds contain the true value, whereas this may not be said of the Gonzalo-Granger PT method. de Jong
(2002) points out that both methods have merit, but that only the IS method takes the variance of the price
innovations into consideration. Also, see Lehmann (2002) for a summary and discussion of a special issue
of the Journal of Financial Markets, on which Lehmann served as editor, devoted to the study of price
discovery , and of the IS and PT methods as they pertain to price discovery.
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method (see Baillie et al. (2002), or as the common share or CS method (see Yan and
Zivot (2007)).16
Studies of price discovery for international cross-listings include Werner and
Kleidon (1996), who examine the two hour contemporaneous overlap in intraday prices
for U.K. stocks cross-listing on the NYSE or AMEX.17 The authors document that
trading volume clusters on both exchanges and bid-ask spreads fall in London during the
two hour overlap, and attribute the clustering to the incorporation of private information.
The authors conclude (page 658) that exchanges in both countries leave distinct
“footprints in the data.”
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) explore international cross-listings from Canada to the
U.S. Using Gonzalo-Granger error correction methods, the authors find that, on average,
the home market (TSE) retains 62% market share of price discovery.18 One possible
implication is that informational advantages associated with the home market have a
stronger effect than any size, liquidity, and investor recognition advantages associated
with the U.S. market. The authors point out that the TSE is very competitive with the
U.S. exchanges and report that the TSE retains a median value of 56% of trades.
Therefore, their results support the proposition that price discovery should take place
16

Huang and Locke (2008) examine price discovery across CME S&P500 futures floor traders, and find
that more active traders (higher volume traders) dominate the futures price discovery process. Interestingly,
and related to the present study, the authors find that price leadership by the more active group increases
when the market becomes more bearish and volatile. Their study provides a stepping stone for the
investigation of price discovery dynamics pre and post the market turmoil period in 2008, delineated by the
watershed Lehman Brothers bankruptcy declaration.
17

Froot and Dabora (1999) examine rate of return differentials of “Siamese twin” companies that pool
their cash flows, and trade around the world. The authors examine three twin companies: Royal Dutch
Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading, PLC; Unilever N.V. and Unilever PLC; and SmithKline
Beecham. Their tests indicate that the relative price of twin stocks correlate highly with the relative stockmarket indexes of the countries where the stocks of the twin companies most actively trade. Their results
indicate that prices depend heavily on the location where the most active trading occurs.
18

Ding et al. (1999) apply Gonzalo and Granger methods to examine cross-listings from Malaysia to
Singapore. They find that the majority of price discovery (approximately 70%) occurs in the home county.
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mostly in the home market (also see Bacidore and Sofianos (2002), and Solnik (1996)).
Their findings also show that price discovery may be driven by trading volume,
especially by the trading of informed investors, which is consistent with the arguments
and findings of Hasbrouck (1995) for the U.S. exchanges.
Many studies suggest that the advantages of trading on the NYSE versus an
emerging market are substantial enough to lead to order flow migration, in which most of
the trading migrates to the NYSE (Moel (2001)). Halling et al. (2007) shows that the
trading volume migrates to the U.S. especially for cross-listings from countries located
close to the U.S. and that are characterized by low financial development and poor insider
trading protection. Since price discovery is strongly affected by the proportion of trading
activity that takes place across the competing markets, a logical question is to ask
whether the price discovery process migrates along with order flow. And if so, are
emerging markets on the brink of extinction?19
Often, existing literature limit the analysis to two markets with similar
characteristics, such that the relative disadvantages of trading in the home-market as
opposed to the international market are slight. But not all markets are twins. Very little is
understood about the price discovery process when stocks internationally cross-list and
the two exchanges differ along multiple dimensions. My study addresses this void in the
literature.
2.2.

Stock Trading Details for Canada, Brazil, and Mexico

19

Current chairman of the Swiss Futures and Options Association, Otto Nägeli, expressed similar opinions,
quoted in a Financial Times article (Hall, 1997): “Sometimes I have the impression that national stock
exchanges are regarded like national airlines. A country needs one to prove its autonomy. That is no longer
valid. There are no boundaries any more except in our minds.” Also, see Angel (1998) for an excellent
discussion of the basic functions of exchanges as well as an historical perspective of the demise of many
exchanges.
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The number of cross-listings of non-U.S. firms on U.S. stock exchanges has soared over
the past decade. For example, at the end of 2000, there were 420 foreign firm crosslistings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but by the end of the decade the
number of cross-listings more than tripled to 1280. Cross-listings offer the opportunity to
own foreign securities through a mechanism that affords the advantages normally
associated with ownership of securities of domestic U.S. issuers. The growing popularity
of cross-listing use is commonly attributed to an increased appetite of U.S. investors to
diversify internationally.
Not only have cross-listings risen dramatically, but the composition of U.S. crosslistings by home country also has changed dramatically over the past two decades. For
example, the number of participating countries more than doubled from 30 to 76 since
1990, mostly attributable to emerging market participation. During the intervening
period, emerging markets have undergone highly publicized market liberalizations,
opening doors to foreign investors for the first time. As further evidence of the growing
participation of non-conventional market cross-listings, at the beginning of 1990, U.K.,
Australia, and Japan constituted 65% of all listings, but by 2003 comprised only 33% of
all listings.
Among the emerging markets, Latin American cross-listings have grown
significantly. For example, Latin America constituted 10% of all cross-listings in 1990,
but over 20% by 2000. Latin America is not the only region tilting the composition of
U.S. cross-listings towards emerging markets. Christopher Sturdy, executive vice
president and head of The Bank of New York Mellon’s Depositary Receipt Division,
recently commented:
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“Exceptional activity from DR investors and issuers occurred in
every region of the world this [2007] past year. In particular, we
witnessed impressive growth in emerging markets, especially from
‘BRIC’ countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.”
In fact, by March 30, 2008, an industry-wide record 2,093 sponsored Depository Receipt
programs, with an estimated asset value of $1.8 trillion, were available.20 At the same
time, non-U.S. equities accounted for 22.7% of all equity investment in the United States.
I select Canada as one of the international markets for several reasons: no other
country has as many cross-listings on the NYSE as Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE) opens and closes at the same times of day as the NYSE, and U.S. and Canada
share a common geographic border with significant cross-country economic trade.
Canadian stocks traded in the U.S. as ordinary shares. Therefore, a study of minute-by
minute prices quotes and trading volume during 2008 for Canadian cross-listings will
offer keen insights into the effects of price discovery between two closely linked
developed markets during a time of escalating economic turmoil.
Trading on the TSE is done electronically, and market makers serve central roles
similar to NYSE specialists. As explained by Smith et al. (2001) and Eun and Sabherwal
(2002a and 2002b), TSE subscribers have access to the order book, including price and
the aggregate size of orders at the market, and at either side of the market bid and ask
prices. Trading on the TSE is regulated by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).
The tick size on TSE stocks is $CAN 0.01.21

20

Bank of New York Mellon Press Release, 6/14/2008
http://www.bnymellon.com/pressreleases/2008/pr071408b.html
21

By February 2001, all NYSE stocks moved to decimalization pricing (pricing in denominations of
$0.01).
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The Mexican market is of particular interest because it is an important emerging
market, its stock exchange (the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, or BMV) shares the same
trading hours as the NYSE, it shares a common border with the U.S., and most of its
exports are sent to the U.S. For example, in 2008 (the year of my study), 80.51% of the
Mexican exports went to the U.S., and 49.2% of the Mexican imports came from the U.S.
(from the Secretaria de Economia).
On the BMV, shares can be issued under different series; primarily series A, B, C,
L, and O shares. Series A shares are restricted to Mexican nationals, but can be acquired
indirectly by foreigners via ADRs or hedge funds. Series B shares are unrestricted as to
the domicile of the investor. Series C shares can be owned by foreigners, but carry
limited voting rights, and are constrained to be within stated limits of total capital of the
issuing firm. Series L shares can be owned by foreigners, but have limited or no voting
rights. Series O shares are ordinary shares of financial firms, and carry full voting rights.
Trades on the BMV are done electronically and are processed through the BMV
SENTRA Capitales electronic system (Electronic System for Negotiation, Transaction,
Registry and Allocation). The SENTRA Capitales system is administered by the BMV
for the trading and negotiation of securities in the stock market, provides real-time
information with complete access to the order book, and “identifies the best alternatives
for the investors and allows a direct participation in the markets.”22 Trading on the BMV
is regulated by the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), the Banco de
México (Banxico), and the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP, also known
as the Hacienda). The tick size for stocks trading on the BMV is MXN 0.01.

22

BMV website: www.bmv.com.mx
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The Brazilian market is of special interest as one of the fastest growing emerging
markets. Its real GDP growth averaged 3.64% during 2001 - 2010, and Brazil was
awarded investment grade status in April 2008. For comparison, during 2001 – 2010, real
GDP growth averaged 1.89% in Canada, 1.66% in Mexico, and 1.58% in the U.S. (IMF
World Economic Outlook, April 2012).
The São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo, or BOVESPA)
trading hours include a 15-minute pre-opening period from 9:45AM – 10AM BRT (BRT
is the time zone abbreviation for “Brazil Time”). The market then runs from 10AM
through 5PM BRT. Sao Paulo is one hour ahead of the New York for most of the year.
Therefore, the São Paulo Stock Exchange normal trading hours are from 9AM – 4PM
ET.23
The Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange merged with BOVESPA in
2008, forming BM&FBOVESPA. For simplicity, I will refer to the stock exchange as
BOVESPA. Trades on the BOVESPA are done electronically, and are processed through
the MEGA BOLSA electronic trading system. The MEGA BOLSA system promotes
“fairness and transparency, allowing brokerage houses and vendors to view all orders in
real time, via private networks.”24 Stock trading on the BOVESPA is regulated by the

23

Adjustments were made for different Daylight Savings Time dates for all markets. For instance, for
Mexico City, 2008 DST began Sunday April 6 at 2AM CT, and ended Sunday October 26 at 2AM CT. For
São Paulo, 2008 DST ended Saturday February 16 at midnight BRT, and began Saturday October 18 at
midnight BRT. For most of the year, there is a full overlap of the BOVESPA with the 9:30AM – 4PM ET
trading day on the NYSE. The pre-opening and opening 30 minutes on the BOVESPA are not used in my
analysis because that time period does not overlap with NYSE trading times. For Toronto, 2008 DST began
Sunday, March 3 at 2AM ET, and ended November 2 at 2AM ET. For New York, 2008 DST began
Sunday, March 9 at 2AM ET, and ended November 2 at 2AM ET. Both the BMV and TSE changed their
opening and closing to match the NYSE throughout the year.
24

From the BM&FBOVESPA Rules and Regulations document.
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Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM) and the Banco Central do Brazil (BCB). The
tick size for stocks trading on the BOVESPA is BRL 0.01.
Mexican and Brazilian stocks that cross-list in the U.S. trade as American
Depository Receipts, or ADRs, which are certificates issued by a U.S. Bank (e.g., The
Bank of New York Mellon is the ADR leader) representing shares of foreign companies,
and are denominated in U.S. dollars. There are four ADRs levels. Level I Sponsored
ADRs trade in the over-the-counter market (less regulation). Level II and III Sponsored
ADRs trade on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Level II and III Sponsored ADRs are
heavily regulated by the SEC, and listing fees for Level III Sponsored ADRs are higher
than other ADRs. For Sponsored ADRs, the foreign firm has greater involvement in the
issue, and investors have the same voting and dividend rights as the home market
shareholders. The fourth type of ADRs are privately placed (SEC Rule 144A) ADRs that
do not require registration with the SEC.
All ADRs (Mexico and Brazil) in my sample are Level II and III ADRs, which
require registration with the SEC, and the filing of annual reports that fully comply with
GAAP standards. To be registered with the SEC, the company must comply with high
disclosure and transparency standards.25 The high disclosure standards facilitate the
examination and oversight of the company by the SEC and investors, and place the ADRs
on a more level playing field.
The three markets provide the largest number of cross-listings of any three
markets, and the three markets span the continuum from developed market (Canada) to

25

Level II ADRs are issued by companies wanting to cross-list in the U.S. Level II ADRs amount to the
indirect purchase of already-existing shares. Level III ADRs are issued by companies wanting to cross-list
and to raise capital via a public offering in the U.S. In contrast, Level I ADRs trade over-the-counter and
are subject to fewer oversight standards.
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emerging market (Mexico). While the three markets share significant intraday overlap,
the geographic proximities of each market to New York differ substantially. All three
markets are major economic trade partners with the U.S. For instance, as of 2010, the
U.S. is the top economic trade partner with Canada and Mexico and is the second biggest
trade partner with Brazil. Despite being classified as an emerging market, Brazil is
among the fastest developing emerging markets (i.e., one of the BRICs), while still in the
initial stages of incorporating free market characteristics.
2.3.

The Data and Methodology

My sample includes 10 Mexican, 13 Brazilian, and 23 Canadian cross-listings for May
2008 through December 2008. In order to estimate contributions to price discovery, I use
tick-by-tick quote and price data from the Securities Industry Research Centre of AsiaPacific (SIRCA) database. SIRCA receives the original data from Thomson-Reuters, and
provides a full breadth of global intraday trade, quote, and market depth for stocks and
other instruments. Thomson Reuters Tick History provides millisecond time-stamped
data for over 35 million OTC exchange-traded instruments worldwide. Additional data
used in the cross-sectional tests are derived from Datastream, Bloomberg, and I/B/E/S.
The following section summarizes my data collection and management procedures.26
2.3.A. Data
I screen all quote data for errors in the same manner as Lockwood (2013) using the Billor
et al. (2000) approach.27 To avoid the disproportionate loss of observations clustered

26

It is common to filter microstructure data, as pointed out in many microstructure papers (see, for
example, Kryzanoski and Zhang (2002) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996)).
27

Obvious data errors (negative spreads, zero spreads, or outrageous spreads) are eliminated, after which I
filter data (price quote and exchange rate) using the Billor et al. (2000) blocked adaptive computationally
efficient outlier nominators (BACON) method. The BACON approach is computationally efficient, and is
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around significant volatility events, I applied the procedures in a univariate manner to
each stock separately for each day. After filtering the data for errors, I form midpoint
prices in order to estimate Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares and each firm’s burden
of adjustment to exchange rates. Intraday bid and ask exchange rate quotes are obtained
from Olsen and Associates.
In order to form synchronous pricing series, I eliminate weekends and holidays
scheduled on the NYSE and holidays scheduled on the home exchange. I exclude stocks
that split during the sample period. As explained in Eun and Sabherwal (2003), stock
splits in the HOME and NYSE exchanges can differ by several days, which would cause
data synchronicity problems in my tests. I also drop the opening quote to eliminate
overnight effects, and to ensure that the time series pertains to the continuous trading
session only (also see Hasbrouck (1995) for similar arguments).
2.3.B. Methodology
To motivate the relative price discovery in the HOME market and the NYSE, I first
provide the theoretical link between prices. For the moment, I ignore market
microstructure issues and other considerations such as transaction cost and exchange-rate
effects. I assume that both the HOME price-series {PHOME ,t } and the NYSE price-series
{PNYSE ,t } are random walk plus noise processes. Also, {PHOME ,t } and {PNYSE ,t } are

constructed to share the same stochastic trend Pt . Intuitively, Pt is a pure random walk

particularly appropriate for large datasets. The BACON method begins by identifying a subset of the
sample (called the “basic sample”) that is “safely” free of outliers. Then, the method iteratively expands on
the basic sample by creating a new basic sample containing observations with acceptable Mahalonobis
distances relative to the previous basic sample median (or mean). The acceptable distance is chosen using a
percentile of the chi-square distribution. Billor et al. used the 95 th percentile in their simulation. The
iterations continue until the size of the basic sample stabilizes. Observations not included in the converged
(final) basic sample are identified as outliers.
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process that represents the implicit efficient price, relevant to computing the contributions
to price discovery.
Formally, prices are assumed to evolve by the following processes:
PHOME ,t  Pt   HOME ,t

(2.1)

PNYSE ,t  Pt   NYSE ,t

(2.2)

Pt  Pt 1  wt

(2.3)

where єHOME,t, єNYSE,t, wt are independently distributed white-noise disturbances. A
unique result stemming from the set-up outlined above is that subtracting the realized
value of PNYSE ,t from the realized value of PHOME ,t yields a stationary sequence:
PHOME ,t  PNYSE ,t  ( Pt   HOME ,t )  ( Pt   NYSE ,t )   HOME ,t   NYSE ,t

(2.4)

Using Engle and Granger’s terminology, premultiplying the 2 × 1 vector
pt  ( PHOME ,t , PNYSE ,t ) by the 1 × 2 cointegrating vector  '  (1, 1) yields the stationary

sequence  HOME ,t   NYSE ,t . We should also expect the sequence PHOME ,t  PNYSE ,t 

 HOME ,t   NYSE ,t to have a mean around zero based on a simple arbitrage argument.
Ignoring market frictions, PHOME ,t  PNYSE ,t  0 implies an arbitrage opportunity and
violates the law of one price. Arbitragers, or simple value shoppers, should keep the two
prices from drifting far apart.
The dynamic model motivated by this discussion is an error correction model.
Enders (2004) describes a vector error-correction (VEC) model as a vector autoregression
(VAR) “augmented with an error term.” A simple error-correction model that can apply
to the two price series is:
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PHOME ,t   HOME ( PHOME ,t 1  bPNYSE ,t 1 )   HOME ,t

(2.5)

PNYSE ,t   NYSE ( PHOME ,t 1  bPNYSE ,t 1 )   NYSE ,t

(2.6)

As specified, the prices respond to the previous period’s deviation from long-run
equilibrium and stochastic shocks. For example, suppose that (PHOME,t-1 – bPNYSE,t-1) > 0,
so that the equilibrium error is positive. In this case, the price at HOME will fall and the
price on the NYSE will rise to restore the long-run equilibrium (assuming prices are
mutually adjusting). The adjustment parameters  HOME and  NYSE measure the degree to
which PHOME ,t and PNYSE ,t respond to the previous periods deviation from long-run
equilibrium. If both of the alpha coefficients are significant, then prices are mutually
adjusting. If only one alpha is significant (e.g.,  NYSE ) then the NYSE bears all the burden
of adjustment to restore long-run equilibrium. If neither of the alpha coefficients are
significant then the error correction term drops out of the equation, so that the prices are
not cointegrated. Nevertheless, the most important issue at hand is how the parameters of
the VEC model are employed to measure the relative price discovery in the HOME
market and the NYSE.
The information share method starts with a fully specified error-correction model
written in matrix form:
N

pt  c   ' pt 1    s pt  s   t

(2.7)

s 1

where ∆pt is the 2 × 1 vector of prices, c is 2 × 1 vector of constants, α is the 2 × 1 vector
of adjustment parameters, β’ is the 1 ×2 cointegrating vector, and єt is the 2 × 1 vector of
error terms. This model has the same properties as the simple model described above, but
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is more general. The only difference, besides notation, is that a vector of constants, c,
and 2 × 2 matrices of AR coefficients (denoted  s ) have been added.
In order to define the Hasbrouck IS, Equation (2.7) must be expressed as a vector
moving average (VMA) model. Employing the Wold Representation Theorem:
pt   t  1 t 1  2 t 2 

 ( L) t .

(2.8)

Next, applying the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition to ( L) t and separating
Equation (2.8) into two components:
t

pt   (1)  s  * ( L) t

(2.9)

s 1

where (1)  I  1  2  , and measures the long-run impact of a shock to the
level of prices, and Ψ* is a matrix polynomial. The value of the  (1) elements can be
backed out of the parameterized VEC model Equation (2.7) by computing the impulse
response functions.
In Hasbrouck’s framework, there is one cointegrating relationship and one
underlying random walk process so that the rows in  (1) are identical. Defining ψ as a
(1 × 2) common row of  (1) , Equation (2.9) can be re-written:

 t

pt      s   * ( L) t
 s 1 

(2.10)

where the ε are (2 × 1) vectors of random errors (εHOME , εNYSE)’, and ι is a (2 × 1) vector

 t 
of ones. The term     s  is a permanent random walk component that is common to
 s 1 
all prices and represents the efficient price. Hasbrouck defines the information share as
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the proportion of variance of the price process attributable to each market. Formally, the
information share for market j is:

IS j 

([ C ] j ) 2
 

(2.11)

where [ψ C] j is the jth element of the (1 × 2) row vector [ψ C] ,   Var ( t ) is the (2 × 2)
variance-covariance matrix of the errors or “innovations”, and C is the (2 × 2) lower
triangular matrix derived from a Cholesky decomposition of Ω (e.g., Ω  CC  ).
Hasbrouck’s IS for market j depends on the ordering of the variables, and yields a
lower and upper bound, depending on the repeated re-ordering of the variables. This
result stems from the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix, Ω.
Booth et al. (2002) suggest taking the midpoint of the upper and lower bounds of the IS
solution to obtain a single measure for the IS of market j. Ballie et al. (2002) and
Grammig and Peter (2013) point out that the distance between the upper and lower
bounds can be rather wide, especially in the presence of contemporaneous correlation,
blurring the IS interpretation.28 Hasbrouck (2003) suggests using higher frequency data to
reduce the contemporaneous correlation, effectively tightening the spread between the
upper and lower bounds. In other words, the upper and lower bound for Hasbrouck’s IS
will be much wider for data sampled at 10 minute intervals compared to 1 minute
intervals. In my study, I apply the Hasbrouck (midpoint IS) method on 1-minute data.
2.3.C. Cross-Sectional Tests
I analyze the determinants of price discovery using cross-sectional regressions. The
dependent variable is the NYSE information share for each stock. I examine relations of
28

As a rule of thumb, contemporaneous correlation above .20 is considered significant (Enders, 2004).
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the NYSE information with variables that capture trading characteristics such as trading
costs, trading volume, market depth, and exchange rate effects. I also include controls for
company size, market-to-book equity ratio, and analyst recommendation dispersion. All
explanatory variables are defined below.
2.3.C.i Trading Costs
All else equal, investors will confine trading to the local exchange if transactions costs
are lower on the local exchange. For each stock, relative trading cost is defined as the
ratio of the percent bid-ask spread of the HOME exchange to the percent bid-ask spread
on the NYSE exchange. The percent bid-ask spread is defined as:

BAi , X ,t 

Aski , X ,t  Bidi , X ,t
0.5( Aski , X ,t  Bidi , X ,t )

(2.12)

where Aski,X,t and Bidi,X,t are the exchange X ask and bid prices, respectively, for stock i
as of the end of 1-minute interval t. For each 1-minute interval, I calculate the spread
ratio, SR, defined as the 1-minute percentage bid-ask quote spread for the HOME market
divided by the 1-minute percentage bid-ask quote spread for the NYSE:

SRi ,t 

BAi , HOME ,t
BAi , NYSE ,t

(2.13)

I hypothesize that price discovery takes place primarily on the market with the
lower relative trading costs. I expect that the high cost exchange will bear larger burden
to adjust prices, or, alternatively, that the low cost exchange will dominate the price
discovery process. For example, assuming narrower spreads on the NYSE, the HOME
market maker likely will feel compelled to respond to the NYSE prices. Therefore, I
expect the slope coefficient to be positive, implying that a high SR (high costs on the
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HOME market versus the NYSE) will induce a high price discovery contribution for the
NYSE.
2.3.C.ii. Trading volume
For each stock, I develop a relative trading volume percentage, defined as the USD value
of shares traded on the NYSE divided by the USD value of shares traded on both
exchanges. For each minute, volume equals the cumulative number of shares traded
multiplied by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices as of the end of the minute. I define
PVOLi,t as the USD value of shares traded on the NYSE divided by the USD volume
traded on both the NYSE and HOME exchanges:

PVOLi ,t 

VOLi , NYSE ,t
VOLi , NYSE ,t  VOLi , HOME ,t

(2.14)

I hypothesize that increased volume improves liquidity and should attract informed
traders. Further, in attempts to attract trading volume, market makers on the lower
volume exchange will likely be more motivated to adjust their bid-ask quotes in order to
attract volume. In other words, the lower volume exchange likely has a greater burden to
adjust prices, implying that the exchange with higher volume likely dominates the price
discovery process. Therefore, I hypothesize that the sign on the slope coefficient will be
positive, implying that higher relative volume on the NYSE should translate to higher
price discovery on the NYSE.
2.3.C.iii. Market depth
Market depth refers to the trading volume needed to move the stock price by a given
amount, and measures the ability of the market to absorb trades without affecting market
prices. For market depth, I use the well-established Kyle’s Lambda (Kyle, 1985), which
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measures the extent to which stock prices change relative to the volume traded and is
estimated as the slope coefficient in:
%Pi , X ,t  X ,iVoli , X ,t   i , X ,t

(2.15)

where, for stock i, transaction t, on exchange X, %∆Pi,X,t is the percent change in the
stock price times 100, Voli,X,t is the number of shares traded (in multiples of 1,000
shares), and  i , X ,t is a random error. While the price discovery analysis requires the use of
quote data, here I use transaction prices to derive market depth measures. Generally
speaking, Kyle’s Lambda is expected to be high for stocks with greater private
information. For example, in the model developed by Kyle (1985), informed traders
conceal private information by trading at rates inversely proportional to price impact.
For example, consider stock i with recent price of $100 and NYSE ,i of 0.05. For
this stock trading on the NYSE, a 1,000 share trade is associated with a 0.05 percent
change in the price to $100.05 (for a buy order) or to $99.95 (for a sell order). A steeper
slope implies lower depth and reflects a larger price impact for a given trade volume.
For each stock, I calculate the difference in market depth for the two exchanges,

i , HOME  i , NYSE . Therefore, a positive 0.01 difference implies that the HOME prices
changed 0.01% more than NYSE prices, for the same stock, after controlling for trading
volume. A positive difference indicates that the HOME market has less depth relative to
the NYSE. Therefore, I expect that the NYSE information share will be positively related
to the depth difference variable; i.e., that price discovery is higher on the deeper
exchange.
2.3.C.iv. Translation Risk Percentage
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Based on a 3-system vector error correction model on 1-minute data, I derive long-run
impacts of a shock to the exchange rate on prices on the HOME market and the NYSE,
respectively. For each stock, I create a translation risk percentage (TRP) equal to:

TRPi 

ABS (ˆ i , NYSE , E )
ˆ i , HOME , E  ABS (ˆ i , NYSE , E )

(2.16)

where, for stock i,  i , NYSE , E ( i , HOME , E ) measures the burden of the NYSE (HOME) price
to adjust to exchange rates. E is the HOME currency price of $1 U.S. dollar (e.g., E
increases as the U.S. dollar strengthens relative to the HOME currency, or, alternatively,
as the HOME currency depreciates relative to the U.S. dollar). Details of the psi
estimation for Equation (2.19) are provided in Lockwood (2013).29
Either the price of the stock on the HOME exchange, PHOME ,t , must respond (as
measured by  i , HOME , E ) to the exchange rate shock, or the price of the cross-listing on the
NYSE, PNYSE ,t , must respond (as measured by  i , NYSE , E ) to the exchange rate shock, or
both series must respond. The sum of both parameters (in absolute value) can be
interpreted as the combined total response to an exchange rate shock. Therefore, TRP
equals the NYSE’s percent share of the adjustment to exchange rate shocks. If responses
to an exchange rate shock are symmetric then TRP will equal 50 percent. I expect the
NYSE information share is negatively related to the TRP variable; i.e., the NYSE
information share is higher (lower) if the NYSE bears a lower (higher) burden to adjust to
exchange rates.
2.3.C.v. Control Variables
29

Also, see Grammig et al. (2005) and Frijns et al. (2010) for treatments of exchange rate effects in
derivations of conditional information shares.
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I include the following control variables: firm size, market-to-book equity, analyst
recommendation dispersion, and a financial industry dummy variable. I discuss expected
relations of the NYSE information share with each variable below, and offer informationrelated explanations for each relation. Predictions explained below for the control
variables assume that informed trades occur mostly on the HOME market.
Information is generally more obscure for smaller firms. I conjecture that
informed trades have a larger price discovery impact for small firms than for large firms.
For instance, consider a failed Phase III clinical trial drug test for a small Mexican
pharmaceutical. The announcement is likely to have a larger stock price impact on the
small Mexican firm versus a large Mexican firm that is more able to absorb the bad news.
For each firm, I calculate firm size equal to the natural logarithm of total assets, obtained
quarterly from BLOOMBERG. I hypothesize that the NYSE information share will be
positively related to firm size.
Fama and French (1993), Lakonishok et al. (1994), and others show that stocks
with high market equity to book equity ratios tend to have high growth rates in sales,
earnings, and cash flow. I expect that private information has a greater effect on prices
for growth firms versus non-growth firms because less is known about growth firms. For
growth firms, most of the stock price reflects a high present value of uncertain future
growth opportunities. The market-to-book data are obtained monthly from
DATASTREAM . I hypothesize that the NYSE information share will be negatively
related to the market-to-book ratio.
Analyst recommendation dispersion is assumed to be positively related to the
amount of private information (Barry and Jennings (1992)), and is often used to proxy
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information uncertainty (see Miller (1977), Diether et al. (2002) and Johnson (2004)). I
derive analyst recommendation dispersion from I/B/E/S, which, for each stock for each
month, equals the cross-sectional standard deviation across U.S. analyst
recommendations (1 = strong sell, 5 = strong buy). I hypothesize that the NYSE
information share will be negatively related to analyst recommendation dispersion.
I include the financial industry dummy variable because, presumably, information
for financial firms intensified during 2008. Financial stocks were hit the hardest during
the 2008 crisis. For example, returns for the S&P500 versus the financial sector SPDR
(XLF) were -6.4% versus -18.7% over May 1, 2008 – August 31, 2008 and -29% versus 40.1% over September 1, 2008 – December 2008. As explained in Appendix 2.A, key
economic events during the latter part of 2008 focused on plummeting financial market
casualties such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Merrill
Lynch, AIG, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia.
To control for financial industry effects, I include a dummy variable equal to one
for all financial stocks, zero otherwise. I caution the reader that all of the financial stocks
in my sample are Canadian stocks. Therefore, the slope on the financial industry dummy
variable in my simple linear regressions may capture a combined effect of the financial
industry and Canadian versus emerging markets effect. A more relevant measure of the
financial industry effect is provided by the multiple linear regressions, which control for
many cross-sectional differences in Canadian versus emerging market stock
characteristics. I expect that the NYSE information share is negatively related to the
financial industry dummy variable.
2.4.

Testable Propositions

63

2.4.A. Market Dominance Proposition
I examine a market dominance proposition in which price discovery migrates to the
market that provides the best trading venue in terms of volume, bid-ask spreads, market
depth, and insensitivity to exchange rates. The market dominance proposition is
supported if the cross-sectional variation in NYSE information shares is positively related
to the trading cost and volume variables defined in Equations (2.16) and (2.17), and
negatively related to the price impact and translation risk percentage variables defined in
Equations (2.18) and (2.19). A rejection of the market dominance proposition implies that
price discovery occurs mainly on the home exchange, regardless of trading characteristics
(e.g., insignificant relations between the NYSE information share and the trading
characteristic variables). For example, informational advantages might be associated with
the proximity of the company headquarters to the stock exchange, implying that
company-specific information is available first to the home market, and then to
competing markets. In this case, prices tend to move first in the home market followed by
prices in competing markets, regardless of volume, cost, depth, or exchange rate burdens
between the NYSE and HOME markets.
2.4.B. NYSE Price Discovery Crisis Proposition
I also examine the proposition that price discovery migrates toward the NYSE in the
financial crisis period. Price discovery might migrate toward the NYSE because a greater
amount of relevant macroeconomic information was being produced in New York during
the crisis due to extraordinary policy decisions being implemented by U.S. government
authorities such as the Fed and the SEC. Alternatively, a rejection of the NYSE price
discovery migration proposition indicates that price discovery migrates toward the home
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market in the crisis period. For example, price discovery might migrate toward the
HOME market if foreign investors reduce their overseas activity during financial crises.
The crisis proposition is tested by examining the changes in the NYSE information shares
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
2.4.C. Market Depth Proposition
Many studies focus on measuring the liquidity of a particular market or a specific firm.
Much of the early work focused solely on bid-ask spreads to draw conclusions regarding
the liquidity of a firm. The basic argument is that wider bid-ask spreads imply lower
liquidity. Although liquidity is closely tied to bid-ask spreads, Lee, Mucklow, and Ready
(1993) emphasize the importance of including a quantity dimension, or depth
measurement, to the price dimension of the spread. Corwin (1999) adds support to this
argument, showing that depth differs significantly across firms listed on the NYSE.
Taken together, these studies support the argument that inferences regarding liquidity,
based solely on the tightness of the spread, can be very misleading - particularly when
correlation between spreads and depth are low or negative.30
Therefore, market depth measures important effects that volume and cost may fail
to capture. For instance, a stock might have a narrower spread on one exchange, but the
volume offered at the bid and ask might be smaller than the competing exchange that
otherwise has wider spreads. Larger purchase orders may have to be parceled at
increasingly higher ask prices, effectively lessening the dominance of the lower cost
exchange. I find that the number of occasions in which an exchange dominates on cost

30

To my knowledge, no price discovery study of cross-listings incorporates a depth variable. I am indebted
to University of South Carolina Professor Steve Mann for suggesting the inclusion of market depth in my
price discovery tests.
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and/or volume, but not on depth is substantial (this issue is discussed in detail in the
Results section).
I examine the proposition that price discovery is greater on the market with
greater depth. The proposition can be extended to a multivariate framework, after
controlling for traditional variables such as trading cost and volume. In the latter case, the
proposition states that price discovery is related to market depth even after controlling for
trading cost and volume (e.g., significant relation between NYSE information shares and
the price impact variable defined in Equation (2.18), after controlling for other trading
characteristics).
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2.4.D. Exchange Rate Burden Proposition
The exchange rate burden measures the degree to which prices adjust to exchange rates.
My TRP variable measures the percent of the combined markets burdens to adjust to
exchange rates borne by the NYSE. A high TRP indicates that New York prices bear
most of the exchange rate burden.
Under the exchange rate proposition, price discovery is greater on the market with
lower burden to adjust to exchange rates (e.g., the NYSE information share is negatively
related to TRP). As with the market depth proposition, the exchange rate burden
proposition can be extended after controlling for traditional trading characteristics, in
which case the proposition states that price discovery is affected by the burden to adjust
to exchange rates regardless of other trading characteristic advantages.
2.5.

Results

Listings of the companies are provided in Tables 2.1 through 2.3, for Canada, Brazil, and
Mexico, respectively. Descriptive statistics for all the variables are reported in Table 2.4.
Results are reported separately for the pre-crisis period May 1, 2008 through August 31,
2008 and for the crisis period September 1, 2008 – December 31, 2008. The periods are
delineated by the September 2008 bankruptcy declaration by Lehman Brothers. A graph
of the 2008 VIX (Figure 2.1) shows that market volatility began spiking in September,
approximately doubling in the month of September from 23.06 to 45.14. Prior to
September, the VIX was fairly stable. I refer to the 4-month period May 1, 2008 – August
31, 2008 as the “pre-crisis period,” and to the 4-month period from September 1, 2008 –
December 31, 2008 as the “crisis period.”
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2.5.A. Stock Characteristics Results
Percentiles for the stock characteristics are presented in Table 2.4, Panels B though H for
relative cost, relative trading volume, depth difference, translation risk percentage, firm
size, market-to-book value, and recommendation dispersion, respectively. Relative costs,
trading volume, market depth, and translation risk percentage are used to identify the
primary exchange for each set of cross-listings. The data show that the TSE is the
primary exchange for most Canadian stocks. The median relative cost is less than one
(cost is less on the TSE), the median relative trading volume is less than 50% (less than
half of the trading volume is executed on the NYSE), and median depth difference is
negative (the TSE is the deeper exchange).
In contrast, the emerging markets are often not the primary exchange. For
example, the median relative cost exceeds one for both Brazil and Mexico (cost is higher
on the BOVESPA and BOLSA, versus the NYSE), the median relative trading volume
exceeds 50% for Mexican stocks (more than 50% of trading in Mexican stocks execute
on the NYSE).31 The median depth difference for Mexico is positive (the NYSE is deeper
than the BOLSA) in the pre-crisis period. The relative cost, trading volume, and market
depth data show that the dominance of the home exchange follows a continuum from the
Canadian TSE (most dominant exchange) to the Mexican BOLSA (least dominant
exchange). The data match well with earlier arguments that Brazil is considered one of
the more advanced emerging capital markets.

31

Brockman and Chung (2003) show that lower quality investor protection induces higher liquidity costs in
the form of wider bid-ask spreads. Therefore, the higher bid-ask spreads that I find for Mexico and Brazil
versus the U.S. are exactly what we would expect assuming investor protection is less in emerging markets
versus the U.S.
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Results also identify interesting patterns in cost and depth between the pre-crisis
and crisis periods. Relative costs (HOME versus NYSE) fell, implying that the home
markets became more competitive on cost during the crisis period. For example, median
relative costs fell from 0.87 to 0.65, from 1.22 to 1.06, and from 1.74 to 1.49, for the
Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican listings, respectively. For the full sample, median costs
fell 17% on the home exchange versus the NYSE during the crisis period. For the
Canadian sample, all of the relative costs fell during the crisis period. For the Brazilian
sample, relative cost fell for 11 of the 13 firms. For the Mexican sample, relative cost fell
for 8 of the 10 firms.
Median market depths became more negative, implying that depths on the NYSE
weakened relative to the home market during the crisis. For example, the median market
depth difference changed from -0.0103 to -0.0278, from -0.0058 to -0.0205, and from
0.0025 to -0.0406 for Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican listings, respectively. For the full
sample, median depth difference fell from -0.004 to -0.0267. Therefore, for a 1,000 share
trade, prices changed 0.4% more on the NYSE versus the HOME markets during precrisis period, but changed 2.67% more on the NYSE versus the HOME markets during
the crisis period. For the Canadian sample, depth difference fell (TSE depth strengthened
relative to the NYSE) for 17 of the 23 firms. For the Brazilian sample, depth difference
fell for 11 of the 13 firms and for the Mexican sample, depth difference fell for 9 of the
10 firms.
Interestingly, the changes in relative costs and market depth were not
accompanied by changes in relative trading volume. Panel C shows that relative trading
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volumes remained fairly constant between the pre-crisis and crisis periods for each of the
three HOME markets.
The declines in relative costs and depth differences were economically
meaningful and pervasive, and point to clear structural shifts in market characteristics
between the pre-crisis and crisis period. The decrease in relative costs for the HOME
markets versus the NYSE and the decline in depth for the NYSE versus the HOME
markets have similarly clear implications for a migration of price discovery from the
NYSE to the HOME markets, which will be discussed in detail in the following section.
Results for the translation risk percentage indicate, relative to TSE prices, that
New York prices bore the brunt of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks for most
Canadian stocks. The median TRP equals 69% in the pre-crisis period and 75% in the
crisis period. Results are less tilted toward a NYSE burden for the Mexican and Brazilian
sample (median TRPs range from 44% to 62% for Brazil and Mexico over the two
periods).
Figure 2.2 presents graphs of the paired coordinates for percent spreads, trading
volume (monthly average, $USD in millions, using intraday trades), Kyle’s Lambdas,
and TRPs for pre-crisis and crisis periods. Points below the 45 degree line indicate stocks
for which the variable is larger on the NYSE versus the HOME market. The Figure
shows that percent spreads grew for most stocks during the crisis period. Trading volume
declined generally and became more clustered especially at the low end during the crisis
period. Kyle’s Lambdas generally shifted below the 45 degree line, illustrating the
dramatic strengthening of market depth of the HOME markets relative to the NYSE
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during the crisis. TRPs also become more disperse, especially beneath the 45 degree line
(greater NYSE burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks) during the crisis.
To quantify the degree of market dominance and to synthesize the multiple
characteristic dimensions, I calculate a composite dominance score based on relative
trading cost, relative trading volume, depth difference, and translation risk percentage.
For each stock, for each month, binary scores are assigned to each of the four variables.
The binary score for relative cost equals 1 if trading cost is less on the HOME market
versus the NYSE. Identical procedures are followed for relative volume (score equals 1 if
trading volume is higher on the HOME market), for market depth (score equals 1 if
market depth is greater on the HOME market; i.e., if Kyle’s Lambda is smaller on the
HOME market versus the NYSE), and for the translation risk percentage (score equals 1
if the HOME market bears less of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks). For each
stock, the binary scores are summed, ranging from a minimum of zero (complete NYSE
dominance) to a maximum of four (complete HOME market dominance), and divided by
4 to provide a dominance percentage. The table reports percentages averaged across
stocks within each market. Panel A presents results for the pre-crisis period, and Panel B
presents results for the crisis period. The final row in each panel reports the dominance
score, Dom Score, which equals the average of the dominance percentages for the four
variables, times 100. A score above 50 indicates that market characteristics favor the
HOME market.
As illustrated in Table 2.5, the degree of dominance differs substantially across
the three markets. Dominance scores for Canada equal 78.85 (76.32), indicating that
approximately 79% (77%) of the market characteristics favored the TSE relative to the
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NYSE during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Dominance scores for Brazil show that
approximately 56% (69%) of the market characteristics favored the BOVESPA relative
to the NYSE during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Dominance scores for Mexico show that
approximately 36% (49%) of the market characteristics favored the BOLSA relative to
the NYSE during the pre-crisis (crisis) period.
These results demonstrate a consistent ordering of market dominance (relative to
the NYSE) for both periods from Canada to Brazil to Mexico. Most of the cross-country
differences in dominance scores are statistically significant. For instance, t-statistics for
differences in dominance scores during the pre-crisis period are: 4.34 between Canada
and Brazil, 7.90 between Canada and Mexico, and 3.53 between Brazil and Mexico. And,
t-statistics for differences in dominance scores during the crisis period are: 1.46 between
Canada and Brazil, 4.59 between Canada and Mexico, and 3.13 between Brazil and
Mexico. Interestingly, market dominance scores rose significantly for Brazil and Mexico
during the crisis period, which correspond with declining NYSE information shares
(Panel A of Table 2.4). The differences in market dominance across markets and time add
to the robustness of the price discovery tests performed in this paper. Most studies are
limited in this regard.
Of the control variables reported in Table 2.4 (Panels F - H), Canadian firms
tended to be larger, with higher market-to-book values, and less recommendation
dispersion versus Mexican and Brazilian firms. At the other end of the spectrum,
Mexican firms tended to be smaller, with lower book-to-market values versus Canadian
and Brazilian firms. The Brazilian sample falls in the middle.
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These results highlight wide variation in the market characteristics for the three
sampled markets versus the NYSE. Most importantly, the data show that the home
market is not always the primary exchange. The data also indicate that cross-sectional
variation in the variables is substantial across and within markets, all of which should
lead to robust tests of the price discovery process.
2.5.B. Price Discovery Results
2.5.B.i. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the NYSE information shares are presented in Panel A of Table
2.4. The Panel shows that NYSE information shares are much lower for cross-listings
from Canada than from Brazil or Mexico. For example, the median NYSE information
share is less than 50% for Canadian cross-listings, but exceeds 50% for listings from
Brazil and Mexico. The results support the market dominance proposition that price
discovery migrates toward the market with the more advantageous trading venue.
NYSE information shares drop during the crisis period. During the pre-crisis
(crisis) period, the median NYSE information share fell from 49% to 45% for Canadian
stocks, from 74% to 57% for Brazilian stocks, and from 61% to 57% for Mexican stocks.
Over the entire sample, the NYSE information share drops from 57.74% in the pre-crisis
period to 50.01% in the crisis period, a difference that is statistically significant at the
0.001 level (pairwise difference t-statistic equals 4.92). The NYSE information share
drops for 71.74% of the firms (t-statistic for difference from 50% equals 3.27). These
findings support a price discovery migration proposition in which price discovery
migrates to the HOME market during crisis periods. The drops in NYSE information
shares between the pre-crisis and crisis periods can be explained partially by the
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improvements in relative cost and market depth for the HOME market as discussed
above. The improvements in cost and depth may have attracted more informed traders to
the HOME market during the crisis period, which, in turn, may have led to increases in
HOME information shares (alternatively, decreases in NYSE information shares).
Assuming informed traders seek cheaper and deeper markets to minimize price impacts
of their trades, then the drop in NYSE information shares during the crisis period is not
surprising.
2.5.B.ii. Cross-Sectional Regression Price Discovery Results
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present results of cross-sectional regressions for the NYSE
information shares for the period spanning all trading days May 1, 2008 – August 31,
2008 (the “pre-crisis” period) and September 1, 2008 – December 31, 2008, (the “crisis”
period), respectively. The dependent variable is the NYSE information share.
MV to BV + equals the market value of equity to book value of equity ratio for
positive ratios only, otherwise MV to BV + equals zero. MV to BV dummy equals 1 if the
market to book value ratio is negative. Recomm dispersion (3) is the standard deviation of
U.S. analyst recommendations (coded 1 for strong sell to 5 for strong buy), when the
number of analysts equals 3 or greater, otherwise recomm dispersion (3) equals zero.
Recomm dispersion dummy equals 1 when the number of analysts is less than 3.
Otherwise, Recomm dispersion dummy equals zero. Financial dummy equals one (zero)
for all financial (non-financial) firms. For each of the two tables, results for simple linear
regressions are presented in columns 1 through 8.
Results of the multiple linear regressions are reported in column 9 in each table.
To control for high correlations among relative costs, relative trading volumes, and depth
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differences, I create an orthogonalized relative costs variable (resid relative costs) which
equals the residual of the regression of relative cost against relative trading vol and depth
difference. Similarly, resid trading vol is the residual of the regression of relative trading
vol against relative cost and depth difference. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below
each parameter estimate. Panel corrected Huber/White standard errors are used to derive
all t-statistics. For each variable (with the exception of the dummy variables), I will
provide an interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients by, first, creating
the baseline case in which all explanatory variables equal their respective sample
medians. Then, I will increase each variable individually by 1 standard deviation of the
observed values of the variable. A summary of these results is provided in Table 2.8.
As expected, NYSE information shares are higher for stocks with lower NYSE
versus HOME trading costs and for stocks with greater NYSE versus HOME trading
volume (e.g., slope coefficients on relative cost and relative trading vol are positive and
statistically significant in all univariate regressions in Tables 2.6 and 2.7). These results
agree with those of Eun and Sabherwal (2003b) in their study of Canadian cross-listings.
As shown in Panel B of Table 2.8, percentage point changes in the NYSE information
share associated with 1 standard deviation changes in relative cost equal 4.07 (2.96) for
Canadian stocks, 3.17 (2.21) for Brazilian stocks, and 5.00 (4.50) for Mexican stocks,
during the pre-crisis (crisis) period. Combining the sampled stocks, results show that a 1
standard deviation increase in relative cost leads to an estimated change in NYSE
information shares of 4.07 (3.37) percentage points during the pre-crisis (crisis) period.
Similarly, for trading volume effects during the pre-crisis (crisis) period, a 1 standard
deviation increase in relative trading volume leads to a 5.96 (5.43) percentage point
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increase in the NYSE information share. Results from the univariate regression (Panel A)
are similar to those derived from the multivariate regression (Panel B).
My tests of depth differences show that the NYSE information is higher for crosslistings in which the NYSE is the deeper market (coefficient on depth difference is
positive). These findings are new to the literature and emphasize the importance of
market depth effects for price discovery research. As illustrated in Panel B of Table 2.8,
for the entire sample, a 1 standard deviation increase in depth difference is associated
with a 3.87 percentage point increase in the NYSE information share in the pre-crisis
period, and a 3.83 percentage point increases in the crisis period. These results show that
the importance of market depth rivals that of trading cost as a determinant of price
discovery, further illustrating the importance of including market depth in price discovery
tests. Results from the univariate regressions (Panel A) are similar to the results from the
multivariate regressions, indicating that the depth findings are not merely a statistical
artifact of orthogonalization methods used in the multivariate regressions. These findings
support the market depth proposition showing the market depth is an important
determinant of price discovery, even after controlling for traditional venue characteristics
such as trading volume and cost.
As expected the slope coefficient on TRP is negative and significant, implying
that higher burdens of New York prices to adjust to exchange rate shocks are associated
with lower NYSE information shares. Results also show that the slope coefficient
increased markedly during the crisis period (e.g., from -0.17 to -0.26 in the multivariate
regression). A 1 standard deviation increase in the translation risk percentage (TRP)
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leads to a 3.64 (6.91) percentage point decrease in the NYSE information share during
the pre-crisis (crisis) period.
Of the four variables, the contribution of TRP rose the most during the crisis
period. The dramatic rise in the importance of TRP is not surprising in light of the
soaring volatility in exchange rates during the crisis period. From September 1 through
the end of 2008, the U.S. dollar rose over 15% relative to the Canadian dollar, 32%
relative to the Brazilian real, and 30% relative to the Mexican peso. Results reported in
Table 2.8 show that the soaring exchange rate volatility was associated with a TRP effect
on price discovery that was nearly double its pre-crisis effect. These findings support the
exchange rate proposition showing that the burden to adjust to exchange rates is an
important determinant of price discovery and offers incremental information beyond
traditional trading volume and cost variables.
Results on the control variables (Tables 2.6 and 2.7) show that NYSE information
shares are lower for bigger firms, but the relation is not significant in the multiple linear
regressions suggesting that the firm size effect is subsumed by other variables in the
regression. The sign of the size coefficient is counter to my priors that the HOME market
has an information advantage for smaller firms, but is similar to the results reported by
Eun and Sabherwal (2003b) in their study of Canadian cross-listings. At the very least,
the inclusion of firm size ensures that the results for other variables in the multiple linear
regression are not merely a manifestation of firm size effects.
Coefficients for mv to bv (+) are negative and significant in all regressions
indicating, as predicted, that NYSE information share is lower for growth firms (higher
market-to-book firms). The coefficient for recomm dispersion (3) is positive and
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significant in the pre-crisis period, and is insignificant in the crisis period. The pre-crisis
results are counter to my priors that the HOME market possesses an information
advantage for stocks characterized by greater information uncertainty.
The slope coefficient on the financial dummy is negative in all regressions,
indicating that, as predicted, the NYSE information share is lower for firms that were the
most affected by the deteriorating financial conditions of 2008. Based on the multiple
linear regressions, NYSE information shares were approximately 6 (7) percentage points
lower for financials versus non-financials during the pre-crisis (crisis) period, after
controlling for other characteristics of the stocks. These results suggest there were no
changes in the price discovery effects related to the financial sector for the pre-crisis
versus crisis periods.
2.6.

Summary and Conclusions

This study makes five contributions. First, I examine intraday price and volume data for
cross-listings onto the NYSE from Canada, Brazil, and Mexico, and find that market
trading characteristics favor the home market only for Canada. In particular, percent bidask spreads are lower and trading volumes are higher on the Toronto Stock Exchange
versus the NYSE for Canadian stocks, indicating that the home market is the primary or
dominant exchange. For Brazilian stocks, percent spreads are higher and trading volumes
are higher on the BOVESPA versus the NYSE, indicating the home market dominates on
volume, but not on cost. In contrast, for Mexican stocks, percent spreads are higher and
trading volumes are lower on the BMV versus the NYSE, indicating that the home
market is not the dominant exchange. I develop a dominance score based on relative cost,
relative trading volume, market depth, and burden of prices to adjust to exchange rate
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shocks, that shows that the differences in market dominance across the three countries are
statistically significant and follow a distinct continuum from Canada (most dominant) to
Mexico (least dominant). These findings are important because they show that market
characteristics vary significantly across the data, adding to the robustness of the price
discovery tests.
Second, using vector error correction models on 1-minute price and quote data for
46 cross-listings for 2008, I find that the Canadian TSE is the price discovery leader, but
that the Brazilian BOVESPA and Mexican BOLSA are not. Therefore, in contrast to
existing studies, I find that the home market is not always the price discovery leader. I
discuss how these findings are driven by differences in market dominance.
Third, I find that the trading characteristics strengthen in favor of the home
markets during the crisis period September 2008 – December 2008. Trading costs fall on
the home markets relative to the NYSE, market depth strengthens on the home market
relative to the NYSE, and the burden of prices to adjust to exchange rates shocks lessens
on the home market versus the NYSE. The rising dominance of the home markets during
the crisis period also corresponds to a migration of price discovery from the NYSE to the
home markets.
Fourth, I introduce two new variables to the price discovery literature: market
depth and translation risk percentage. Market depth is important for price discovery
because it measures the ability of the exchange to execute large orders with minimal
impact on stock prices. Informed traders seek venues with minimal price impacts.
Therefore, higher market depth should lead to higher price discovery. I argued that
market depth measures dynamics of exchanges that trading volume and bid-ask spreads

79

may fail to capture. The second new variable, translation risk percentage, measures the
burden of prices on each exchange to adjust to exchange rate shocks. Most studies of
price discovery ignore the information effects of exchange rates. I model exchange rates
to play an independent role in the price discovery process. My tests are able to determine
the extent to which price discovery is affected by exchange rate volatility.
Fifth, cross-sectional tests show that the price discovery on the NYSE is higher
for cross-listings with greater NYSE market depth, lower burden to adjust to exchange
rates on the NYSE, with greater trading volume and lower cost, and for smaller, low
market-to-book firms. My tests show that the importance of market depth rivals that of
trading volume and trading costs, which further illustrate the importance of controlling
for market depth when examining price discovery. The burden of prices to adjust to
exchange rates had the largest effect on price discovery of all four variables during the
market crisis period in the latter part of 2008.
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Table 2.1
Canadian Cross-Listing Sample
This table lists the 2008 TSE ticker symbol, company name, industry affiliation, NYSE cross-listing date, and total shares traded
(in millions) for all of 2008 on the TSE and on the NYSE for each of the 27 Canadian cross-listings.
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2008 Ticker
BAM
BMO
BNS
BPO
BVF
CLS
CM
CNQ
CP
ENB
FFH
GAN
GIL
MFC
NCX
NT
NXY
RBA
SLF
TD
THI
TRP
UFS

Name
Brookfield Asset Management Inc
Bank of Montreal
Bank of Nova Scotia
Brookfield Properties
Biovail Corporation International
Celestica Inc.
Canadian Imperial Bank
Canadian Natural Resources Limited
Canadian Pacific Railway
Enbridge
Fairfax Financial
Gainsco
Gildan ActiveWear
Manulife Financial
Nova Chemicals
Northern Telecom
Nexen Inc
Ritchie Brothers Auctioners
Sun Life Financial
Toronto Dominion Bank
Tim Hortons Inc
TransCanada Pipeline
Domtar Corporation

Industry
Financial
Banking
Banking
Real Estate
Pharmaceuticals
Manufacturing
Banking
Oil and Gas
Transportation
Oil and Gas
Insurance
Insurance
Apparel
Financial Services
Chemicals
Switching equipment
Oil and Gas
Industrial Equipment
Insurance
Banking
Restaurant
Oil and Gas
Paper Products

Cross Listing Date
10/5/2005
1/2/1996
1/2/1996
6/2/1999
12/12/1996
7/1/1998
1/2/1996
2/1/2003
1/2/1996
10/30/2001
7/23/1996
7/31/1996
6/10/1998
3/9/1996
7/11/1998
1/1/1996
11/14/2000
3/10/1998
11/14/2002
8/30/1996
3/22/2006
1/3/1996
2/28/1998

Table 2.2
Brazilian ADR Sample
This table lists the 2008 BOVESPA ticker symbol, company name, industry affiliation, NYSE cross-listing date, and ADR-to-share
multiple for each of the 13 Brazilian ADRs.
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2008 NYSE
Ticker
BAK
CBD
SBS
CIG
ELP
CZZ
CPL
ERJ
VCP
GFA
GOL
TAM
TNE

Company Name
Braskem
Companhia Brasil de Distribuição
Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo-SABESP
Comp Energetica de Minas Gerais
Compania Paranaense de Energia
Cosan Limited
CPFL Energia
Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica
Votorantim Celulose e Papel S.A.
Gafisa
GOL Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes
TAM-Companhia de Investimentos em Transportes
Tele Norte Leste Participacoes

Industry
Petrochemicals
Food
Utilities
Energy
Energy
Sugar/Ethanol
Energy
Aerospace
Paper
Construction
Airline
Airline
Telecomm

Cross Listing
Date
8/31/2002
5/31/1997
5/10/2002
8/16/1996
7/30/1997
8/14/2007
1/2/1996
7/18/2000
4/8/2000
3/14/2007
6/23/2004
3/9/2006
11/18/1998

ADR
Multiple
2
2
2
1
1
1
3
4
1
2
1
1
1

Table 2.3
Mexican ADR Sample
This table lists the 2008 BMV ticker symbol, company name, industry affiliation, NYSE cross-listing date, and
ADR-to-share multiple for each of the 10 Mexican ADRs.
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2008
NYSE
Ticker
AMX
ASR
CX
FMX
SIM
HXM
IBA
ICA
KOF
PAC

Company Name
America Movil
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste
Cemex
Fomento Economico Mexicano
Grupo Simec
Desarrolladora Homex
Industrias Bachoco
Empresas ICA
Coca Cola Femsa
Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico

Industry
Telecomm
Industrials
Building Materials
Beverage
Mining and Metals
Housing
Food
Construction
Beverage
Transportation

CrossListing Date
1/2/1996
2/26/2006
1/1/1996
5/9/1998
1/2/1996
6/29/2004
9/22/1997
1/2/1996
1/2/1996
1/2/1996

ADR
Multiplier
20
10
10
10
3
6
12
4
10
10

Table 2.4
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents percentiles for NYSE information share, relative trading volume, relative cost, market depth difference, translation risk percentage,
firm size, market-to-book value, and analyst recommendation dispersion for 23 Canadian cross-listings, 13 Brazilian ADRs, and 10 Mexican ADRs for
May 1, 2008 – August 31, 2008 (pre-crisis period) and for September 1, 2008 – December 31, 2008 (crisis period).
Panel A. NYSE Information Share

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
0.35
0.58
0.33
0.36

p25
0.45
0.67
0.55
0.48

Pre-Cris is
p50
0.49
0.74
0.61
0.56

p25
0.59
0.92
1.38
0.78

Pre-Cris is
p50
0.87
1.22
1.74
1.00

p25
0.13
0.30
0.47
0.24

Pre-Cris is
p50
0.28
0.39
0.52
0.38

p25
-0.0245
-0.0168
0.0005
-0.0168

Pre-Cris is
p50
-0.0103
-0.0058
0.0025
-0.0040

p75
0.52
0.79
0.70
0.70

p5
0.17
0.27
0.14
0.18

p25
0.40
0.46
0.36
0.40

Cris is
p50
0.45
0.57
0.57
0.50

p75
0.52
0.70
0.73
0.61

p95
0.59
0.91
0.86
0.85

p5
0.39
0.56
0.60
0.41

p25
0.45
0.77
1.08
0.57

Cris is
p50
0.65
1.06
1.49
0.83

p75
0.81
1.37
1.84
1.23

p95
1.35
1.61
2.77
2.31

p5
0.06
0.20
0.11
0.08

p25
0.15
0.27
0.45
0.23

Cris is
p50
0.27
0.39
0.55
0.36

p75
0.37
0.48
0.63
0.50

p95
0.74
0.64
0.91
0.80

p5
-0.0956
-0.1162
-0.1891
-0.1082

p25
-0.0423
-0.0426
-0.0540
-0.0536

Cris is
p50
-0.0278
-0.0205
-0.0406
-0.0267

p75
0.0002
-0.0140
-0.0043
-0.0071

p95
0.0081
-0.0118
0.0290
0.0101

p95
0.58
0.89
0.77
0.85

Panel B. Relative Cos t
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Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
0.48
0.73
0.90
0.49

p75
0.99
1.55
1.97
1.50

p95
1.90
8.30
3.15
2.75

Panel C. Relative Trading Volume

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
0.07
0.20
0.15
0.07

p75
0.41
0.48
0.65
0.50

p95
0.85
0.89
0.97
0.87

Panel D. Depth Difference

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
-0.0771
-0.0470
-0.0272
-0.0470

p75
-0.0001
-0.0038
0.0487
0.0006

p95
0.0084
0.0499
0.3152
0.0499

Table 2.4, continued
Panel E. Translation Risk Percentage

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
0.07
0.25
0.29
0.24

p25
0.35
0.39
0.46
0.39

Pre-Crisis
p50
0.69
0.44
0.62
0.52

Crisis
p75
0.85
0.47
0.72
0.72

p95
0.90
0.66
0.89
0.89

p5
0.12
0.10
0.24
0.12

p25
0.33
0.22
0.41
0.35

p5
894
2,395
1,400
1,400

p25
4,663
5,014
2,195
2,804

p5
0.52
0.54
0.45
0.51

p25
1.19
0.89
0.64
0.87

p5
0.58
0.52
0.52
0.52

p25
0.67
0.58
0.76
0.67

p50
0.75
0.51
0.57
0.60

p75
0.90
0.61
0.76
0.80

p95
0.96
0.79
0.87
0.91

p50
20,481
8,004
2,804
8,264

p75
55,972
11,605
15,363
20,962

p95
422,915
19,787
49,269
346,622

p50
1.57
1.38
0.88
1.43

p75
2.36
1.81
1.66
1.95

p95
5.31
3.37
5.51
5.16

p50
0.76
0.83
0.82
0.78

p75
0.88
1.00
1.01
0.96

p95
1.13
1.50
1.13
1.17

Panel F. Size (US $000)

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
1,058
2,566
1,623
1,623

Pre-Crisis
p25
p50
4,834
20,397
5,269
7,978
2,339
4,185
3,658
9,041

p5
0.94
0.86
0.65
0.88

p25
1.69
1.13
1.02
1.38

Pre-Crisis
p50
2.35
1.75
1.64
1.96

p25
0.67
0.58
0.76
0.67

Pre-Crisis
p50
0.76
0.83
0.82
0.78

Crisis
p75
59,586
11,717
16,717
26,845

p95
496,428
17,039
51,929
365,900

Panel G. Market-to-Book Value
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Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

Crisis
p75
3.16
2.34
2.37
2.94

p95
5.83
3.85
6.90
5.83

Panel H. Recommendation Dispersion

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Full Sample

p5
0.58
0.52
0.52
0.52

Crisis
p75
0.88
1.00
1.01
0.96

p95
1.13
1.50
1.13
1.17

Table 2.5
Market Characteristics Percentage Dominance
This table reports market dominance percentages for relative cost, relative trading volume, depth difference, and translation
risk percentage. See Table 4 for definitions of the variables. For each stock, for each month, binary scores are assigned to each
of the four variables. The relative cost binary score equals 1 if, relative to the NYSE, trading cost is less on the HOME market.
Identical procedures are followed for relative volume (score equals 1 if trading volume is higher on the HOME market), for
market depth (score equals 1 if market depth is greater on the HOME market), and for the translation risk percentage (score
equals 1 if the HOME market bears less of the burden to adjust to exchange rate shocks). For each stock, for each month, the
binary scores are summed, ranging from a minimum of zero (complete NYSE dominance) to a maximum of four (complete
HOME market dominance), and divided by 4 to provide a dominance percentage. The table reports percentages averaged
across months and stocks within each market for the Pre Crisis period (Panel A), and then repeated for the Crisis period (Panel
B). The final column in each panel reports the dominance score, Dom Score, which equals the average of the dominance
percentages for the four variables, times 100. t-tests are performed for the null hypothesis that Dom Score equals 50%. The tstatistic in the final column tests the null hypothesis that Dom Score is unchanged between pre-crisis and crisis periods.
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Canada
Brazil
Mexico
**
*

Rel Cost
0.8590
0.3137
0.0789

Rel Vol
0.8718
0.7843
0.4474

significant at the 0.05 level
significant at the 0.10 level

Pre Crisis
Depth
0.7692
0.9216
0.2105

TRP Dom Score
0.6538
78.85**
0.2353
56.37
0.7105
36.18**

Rel Cost
0.9079
0.4400
0.1316

Rel Vol
0.8947
0.8000
0.3947

Crisis
Depth
0.6316
0.9600
0.8158

TRP Dom Score
0.6184
76.32**
0.5600
69.00**
0.6053
48.68

t -stat
-0.55
2.28**
1.88*

Table 2.6
Cross-Sectional Price Discovery Tests, Pre-Crisis Period
This table presents results of cross-sectional regressions for the price discovery for the period spanning all trading days May 1, 2008 – August 31, 2008.
The dependent variable is the NYSE price discovery information share, derived using the Hasbrouck (1995) method. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis below each parameter estimate. Panel corrected Huber/White standard errors are used to derive all t-statistics.
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***

significant at the 0.001 level

**

significant at the 0.05 level

*

significant at the 0.10 level

Table 2.7
Cross-Sectional Price Discovery Tests, Crisis Period
This table presents results of cross-sectional regressions for the price discovery for the period spanning all trading days September 1, 2008 – December
31, 2008. All variables are defined in Table 6. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis below each parameter estimate. Panel corrected Huber/White
standard errors are used to derive all t-statistics.
financial dummy
relative cost

(1)
(2)
-0.1365***
(-6.23)
0.0909***
(5.93)

relative trading vol

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(10)
-0.0727**
(-2.36)

-0.0116
(-1.47)
-0.0222**
(-2.10)
-0.1263**
(-2.49)
-0.0203
(-0.23)
0.0734
(0.88)
0.9137***
(4.38)
-0.2609***
(-6.00)
0.0478
(0.79)
0.166
(0.92)

-0.0116
(-1.47)
-0.0222**
(-2.10)
-0.1263**
(-2.49)
-0.0203
(-0.23)
0.0734
(0.88)

0.3842***
(7.25)

ln(size)

-0.0355***
(-6.33)

mv to bv(+)

-0.0281***
(-2.86)
0.0845
(1.21)

mv to bv dummy
recomm dispersion(3)
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(9)
-0.0727**
(-2.36)

0.0418
(0.52)
0.1889
(1.48)

recomm dispersion dummy
depth difference

0.8423***
(6.32)

TRP

-0.3401***
(-13.83)

resid relative cost
resid relative vol
resid depth difference
constant
R-square
***

0.5233***
(12.79)
0.07

significant at the 0.001 level

**

0.4039***
(10.44)
0.16

0.3527***
(15.01)
0.19

0.8287***
(9.76)
0.09

significant at the 0.05 level

*

0.5415***
(11.21)
0.06

0.4569***
(9.97)
0.04

significant at the 0.10 level

0.5280***
(14.39)
0.05

0.6936***
(17.5)
0.24

0.8514***
(6.41)
0.37

-0.2609***
(-6.00)
0.1058
(2.05)
0.324
(1.98)
1.1261***
(4.38)
0.8225***
(6.27)
0.37

Table 2.8
Relative Contributions of Each Variable to Price Discovery
This table reports impacts on the NYSE information share of each of the main variables of interest: relative cost,
relative trading volume, depth difference, and translation risk percentage. Definitions of the variables are provided in
Table 4. Each entry equals the effect on the NYSE information share of a one standard deviation increase in the
variable in question. For each variable, the entries equal the multiple linear cross-sectional regression slope multiplied
by 1 standard deviation (calculated across all stocks within the same country). Panel A presents results from the
univariate regression. Panel B presents results from the multivariate regression. Results for the full sample are reported
in the final row of each panel.
Panel A. Univariate Results
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Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Sample

Rel Cost
0.0163
0.0148
0.0304
0.0272

Pre-Crisis Period
Rel Vol DepthDiff
0.0609
0.0083
0.0322
0.0052
0.0636
0.0419
0.0622
0.0243

TRP
-0.0777
-0.0258
-0.0533
-0.0635

Rel Cost
0.0282
0.0293
0.0602
0.0495

Crisis Period
Rel Vol DepthDiff
0.0780
0.0183
0.0412
0.0113
0.0815
0.0918
0.0797
0.0531

TRP
-0.0916
-0.0305
-0.0629
-0.0749

Crisis Period
Rel Vol DepthDiff
0.0609
0.0323
0.0353
0.0281
0.0558
0.0557
0.0543
0.0383

TRP
-0.0793
-0.0569
-0.0546
-0.0691

Panel B. Multivariate Results

Canada
Brazil
Mexico
Sample

Rel Cost
0.0407
0.0317
0.0500
0.0407

Pre-Crisis Period
Rel Vol DepthDiff
0.0711
0.0133
0.0397
0.0083
0.0505
0.0669
0.0596
0.0387

TRP
-0.0445
-0.0148
-0.0305
-0.0364

Rel Cost
0.0296
0.0221
0.0450
0.0337

Figure 2.1
The VIX Index 2008

Figure 2.1 shows the weekly Volatility (VIX) Index over the period 1/1/2008
through 12/31/2008.
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Figure 2.2
Pairwise Coordinates
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Figure 2.2, continued
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Figure 2.2, continued
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Figure 2.2, continued

Figure 2.2 show pairwise coordinates are graphed for percent bid-ask spreads, trading
volume (USD), Kyle’s Lambdas, and Translation Risk Percentages.
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APPENDIX A: GREAT RECESSION TIMELINE
CHRONOLOGY OF SEPTEMBER 2008 – DECEMBER 2008 KEY FINANCIAL EVENTS
September:

On September 7, government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac were placed in government conservatorship by the Federal
Housing Finance Agency. On September 15, Lehman Brothers filed for
bankruptcy sending shockwaves through the global financial community.
At the same time, reeling Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America and
the Fed injected enormous amounts of cash into the banking system
including $85 billion alone to AIG. The S&P500 fell nearly 5% on
September 15 and the VIX soared an unprecedented 24%, making it the
worst stock market day in seven years. On September 25, facilitated by the
FDIC, J. P. Morgan acquired failed Washington Mutual Savings and Loan,
which was the largest bank failure in U.S. history.

October:

On October 3, Wells Fargo announced plans to acquire failing Wachovia
Corporation. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger alerts Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner that the liquidity crisis threatened to shut
down the state of California, which he claimed needed a $7 billion
emergency loan from the federal government. Also on October 3,
Congress passed the largest financial bailout in history totaling $700
billion in bailout money, followed later by a clause to use nearly $18
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billion of the $700 (Troubled Asset Relief Program) billion bailout money
to dodge disaster in the automobile industry. The S&P500 dropped nearly
10% over the 2-day period October 6 and 7 after the Fed announced it
would make up to $900 billion available to U.S. banks through its Term
Auction lending facility.

December:

It was discovered that Bernie Madoff of Madoff Investment Securities ran
a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, devastating many institutions and high-net
worth individuals who had invested with his firm.
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